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INTRODUCTION

The government has become increasingly concerned with the
declining ability of the United States to continue its traditional role
of leading the world in the advancement of technology. Although
the United States continues to make some outstanding achievements in the innovation of technology, there is a popular perception
that the competitive edge has worn away in many of our industries.
An inability to maintain a high level of technological innovation
could have serious economic effects on the maintenance of a competitive status in both domestic and foreign markets. Additionally,
a decrease in the advancement of technology may result in a weakened military posture.
Within the past several years, this real or perceived economic
injury has triggered a reaction of protectionism in the United States
with respect to nationally-based commercial enterprises. Domestic
firms and the American public informed Congress that legislation
was necessary to conserve America's economic resources and to protect American industries, jobs, and the economic balance. Concurrently, an economic theory propounding a noninterventionist
governmental policy became popular. This policy supports a free
market to foster competition by limiting both regulation and the
instigation of antitrust suits, which have been perceived as restricting beneficial competition.
President Reagan, who firmly maintains a policy of governmental noninterventionism, appointed William F. Baxter as Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Antitrust Division,
in 1981. Baxter brought with him noninterventionist views and this
outlook has since been reflected strongly in Antitrust Division policy. At the same time, Congress responded to the country's economic slump by proposing and implementing legislation aimed at
stimulating domestic industry, notably by creating tax benefits, promoting risk ventures, and increasing protection for technological
advances (intellectual property). This article identifies and discusses attempts to ameliorate the country's economic problems
through legislation proposed in the early 1980's addressing the perceived underlying inhibitors of free competition: antitrust liability
of joint research ventures, and judicial misconstruction of intellectual property laws and doctrines. Of the pending legislation, the
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Administration itself has proposed what is potentially the most important. The precursor of The National Cooperative Research Act
of 1984 (the NCRA), 1 a bill entitled The National Productivity and
Innovation Act of 1983,2 and its copending legislation, is discussed
and evaluated to determine whether the legislation will achieve the
goals of advancing technological innovation and competition.
A.

Economic Backgroundfor Recent Intellectual Propertyand
Antitrust Legislation

In the past decade, the federal government has become concerned that the United States economy has failed to keep pace with
its trading partners and other industralized countries. 3 A decrease
in the United States' comparative level of technological innovation
may have serious economic consequences, not only in terms of ability to maintain a competitive edge in foreign markets, but also, perhaps as a result of the loss of a competitive international position, in
the domestic market.4 Injury to the domestic economy may result
from competition with foreign concerns for American purchasers
because the United States presents few trade barriers to its indus5
tralized trading partners.
1. PuB. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4301-05).
2. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., (1983); H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); CONG. REc. S12,214-22 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1983); 26 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 456-57 (Sept. 15, 1983).
3. B. BrI'XER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 17 (5th ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as BIrTKER].
4. See S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1984); The National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 1841 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 1st Sss. 3 (1983) (statement of Malcolm
Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as Baldrige]; The National
Productivity and InnovationAct of 1983: Hearings on S. 1841 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1983) (statement of Gerald
Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks) [hereinafter cited as
Mossinghoff]; Garvey, Study of Antitrust Treble Damage Remedy, reprintedin
46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 356, 367 (Mar. 1, 1984) (report to the
House Committee on the Judiciary), [hereinafter cited as Garvey]; Panel Discussion Interview with William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, 50 ANTITRUsT L.J. 151, 168 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Panel

Discussion].
5. The basis for this theory is that major U.S. trading partners, notably
Japan and West Germany, which maintain high levels of innovation and invention, have few trade barriers to the United States' markets, in which they have
developed strong shares. See supra notes 3 and 4. The corresponding decrease
in market share for domestic firms may cause the failure of many American
companies, both large and small, and a decrease in profits for others. As a result, after-tax capital drops, and savings and investments in risk ventures continue to fall, sustaining inflation and recession. This theory, however, is not
universally accepted. Baxter disagrees strongly with this reasoning. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 168.
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There is thus a real need to increase the ability of domestic industries to develop and commercialize new technologies-the products of intellectual application and ingenuity-which will enable
the United States to remain competitive with other countries. Innovation, the introduction of change into the established order, is
the key to such development and, therefore, is vital to the economy.
Innovation stimulates economic and industrial growth, employment, new products and processes, and increases efficiencies in the
production and distribution of existing products, processes and services. Thus, innovation is fundamental to successful economic competition and must be optimized for the United States to maintain its
competitive status in world trade.
Joint research and development ventures play an important
role in the innovation process. Although large organizations often
have the capability to conduct their own research programs, smaller
and less wealthy firms may be unable to engage in independent research and development. 6 When smaller organizations form joint
research ventures, they are able to maximize efficiency by sharing
the costs to produce and commercialize profitable products. This
organizational structure also enables larger companies to compete
more successfully, both nationally and internationally, in many
worldwide technological markets. Thus, research and development
joint ventures allow many organizations to remain competitive.
The decrease in the rate of technological advances in the
United States and the nation's inability to maintain a relatively
competitive advantage in international markets have been attributed to several diverse factors. 7 The first is a decrease in capital
formation and savings, which in turn is attributable to several different sources. Inflation and the concomitant recession of the
United States economy have been described as major sources of the
problem because both decrease the funds available for technological
investment. The steady rate of inflation since the 1960's has effec6. Baldrige, supra note 4, at 3; The NationalProductivity and Innovation
Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 1841 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983) (statement of William A. Niskanen, Member,
Council of Economic Advisors) [hereinafter cited as Niskanen]. It has been proposed that such small firms are leaders in the innovation of high technology
products today. Scheirer, Small Firms and FederalResearch and Development,
(1977) (report to the Rabinow Panel) (available from the National Technical
Information Service, Department of Commerce, and the Office of Federal Procurement, Report No. OMB/OFPP/CA-77/1) [hereinafter cited as Scheirer].
7. See generally Niskanen, supra note 6, at 2-3 (discussing factors contributing to decline of innovation); The National Productivity and Innovation Act
of 1983: Hearings on S. 1841 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1983) (statement of Charles H. Herz, General Counsel, National Science Foundation) (fear of antitrust sanctions as deterrent to joint ventures) [hereinafter cited as Herz]; Interview with William F. Baxter, Assistant
Attorney GeneralAntitrust Division, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 39 (1982) (business
uncertainty about current legal environment).
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tively increased taxpayers' marginal tax rates without increasing
real income.8 The effect of inflation is that taxes become a greater
burden on high income groups, who must at some point reduce
their savings to bear the costs. 9 The decrease in savings has had a
significant impact on investment in risk ventures, such as research
and development joint ventures, because the savings of the higher
income groups and corporations generally support these activities. 10
As taxes consume a greater proportion of income, the supply of capital for investment decreases, which in turn decreases the incentive
to invest in risk ventures associated with innovation.
A second factor accused of inhibiting the development of research joint ventures, and thus restricting economic expansion, is
governmental intervention in commercial and economic affairs,
which many argue should be left to the more perfect control of the
market itself." Proponents of this theory believe that the present
state of the economy resulted from preceding administrations' "erratic macro-economic policies [which] have caused upwardly spiralling inflation and interest rates, and increasingly wild fluctuations
of the economy between boom and bust ... [and which] have also
distorted the operation of the market."' 12
A third reason proposed for the recent decline of economic productivity and growth is the belief that firms are handicapped by the
restrictions of the United States' antitrust laws. Investors fear that
8. BrrrKER, supra note 3, at 13.
9. Id. at 15-17.

10. Id. at 16-17.
11. This is commonly associated with economists of the "Chicago school" of
economic theory. In general, its proponents are price theoreticians who are
skeptical of existing enforcement procedures and governmental intervention in
commercial economics, and who assert that the marketplace is best left free to
its own competitive controls ("laissez-faire" economics). See, e.g., Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); see also
Baldrige, supra note 4, at 5-6; Herz, supra note 7, at 1. For example, the Chicago school proposes that tying arrangements be tested under the rule of reason, as they are often beneficial to competition, and the laws limiting them may
be injurious to free competition and consumer well-being. Posner, supra at 93436. An often conflicting school of economic theory is known as the Harvard
school, whose proponents are economic structuralists. They believe that the
structure of the industrial organization of the market dictates the value of the
activities of the participants, thus government intervention is warranted to free
the market of organizations and activities that could create economic breakdown. A tying arrangement to an economist of this school should be per se
illegal, as the activity creates leverage for the tying party, and thus inherently
possesses no redeeming value. See id.
12. Rule, PrivateEnterprisePolicy and the National Productivity and Innovation Act (address during the National Foreign Trade Council Foundation
Seminar, Oct. 19, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Rule]. Mr. Rule evidently has
strong views on this subject. He argues that competitive market forces allocate
resources most efficiently, whereas "bureaucratic mechanisms ... allocate resources on the basis of the relative electoral strength of competing interest
groups ... [which often have] little to do with the public interest." Id. at 4-5.
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even the most well-meaning joint research ventures risk prosecution under the antitrust laws with all its attendant penalties, including the trebling of damages.1 3 Joint ventures realize economies of
scale and thereby lower the average cost of the average output
product. In contrast, joint ventures that become too large in
number of members and market share may eventually result in the
restriction of output and, thus, increase the risk of anticompetitive
behavior. There is no means to determine whether any particular
joint venture performing at or near scale economies will be perceived as pro or anticompetitive.
In response to the perceived decline of the national economy, a
strong sense of protectionism arose. Domestic firms and the public
informed their elected representatives that conservation of the domestic economy, industries, and jobs was of paramount importance.
In response, Congress proposed and implemented legislation aimed
at stimulating domestic industry by creating tax benefits and promoting risk ventures through: 1) decreasing the risks attendant to
antitrust litigation, 2) increasing the protection for technological advances (intellectual property), and 3) increasing federal funding for
4
research and development.'
B. Economic Policies of the Antitrust Division
The federal antitrust laws and the threat of severe penalties
were apparent deterrents to the formation of research and development joint ventures, which the past several administrations have
recognized as touchstone enterprises for increasing the rate of the
United States' growth in technological fields. To appreciate the importance of the legislation proffered in response to the decrease in
national productivity, it is necessary to understand the antitrust
policies underlying the proposed legislation. The policies held by
the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, which leads governmental enforcement of the antitrust laws, are outlined below. Economics have become the foundation for antitrust enforcement
policy in the Antitrust Division within the past ten years. The following section describes the platform on which the antitrust policies of the government are based.
13. Baldridge, supra note 4, at 4; Garvey, supra note 4, at 362; The National
Productivityand Innovation Act of 1983: Hearingson S. 1841 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984) (statement of Joseph R.
Creighton, Vice President and General Counsel of Harris Corporation) [hereinafter cited as Creighton]; The United States and Canadian Chapter of the Licensing Executives Society, Inc., Statement In Support Of The National
Productivityand Innovation Act of 1983 2 [hereinafter cited as LES Statement];
see Niskanen, supra note 6, at 4-5.
14. Baldrige, supra note 4, at 1-2. Legislative protection for intellectual
property is seen as an incentive for inventors and their investors, thus promoting invention and innovation.
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President Reagan, an ardent noninterventionist, appointed
William F. Baxter to the position of Assistant Attorney General,
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, in 1981.15 Baxter is an
economist of the "Chicago school," although he originally followed
16
the structuralist or "Harvard school" approach to economics.
Baxter's personal economic beliefs comported with the President's
policy of governmental nonintervention, and these two factors are
reflected in the policies he supported as the head of the Antitrust
Division. 17 Accordingly, Baxter decried governmental control of the
market on a national or international scale' 8 via the use of subsidies
or regulatory mechanisms such as the imposition of tariffs.' 9 The
Division under Baxter did recognize, however, that governmental
intervention to increase productivity and enhance the economy is
valid under some circumstances because government must provide
and enforce the law. In doing so, however, technology and the improvement of productivity should be promoted without giving uni15. Baxter left the Division in February, 1984 to accept a faculty position at
Stanford University. His three years of influence on the Division's economic
policy were so strong, however, that it is proper to discuss the Division and its
policies in terms of Baxter's presence there. His successor, J. Paul McGrath,
has just begun to implement his own policies. Although it is evident that there
are differences between the two Division leaders, both are Chicago school
economists.

16. See Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly:
An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966); see also supra note 11.
17. This does not mean that under Baxter the Division refused to enforce
the antitrust laws, but rather that the Division preferred to allow the market's
own competitive forces to implement corrective action, leading to "less rather
than more government intervention in the market." Rule, supra note 12, at 2.
See generally Panel Discussion,supra note 4.

18. Baxter, Antitrust Law and the Stimulation of Technological Invention
and Innovation 55 (discussion paper for the Preparatory Conference on Government Organization and Operation and the Role of Government in the Economy, San Diego, California, July 19-21, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Baxter].
19. Id. at 59. In his speech at the San Diego Preparatory Conference, Baxter stated:
Free trade is the best guarantee of maximizing world wealth....
High tariffs impede the promise of efficient resource allocation by prohibiting countries from taking full advantage of their comparative advantage.
Subsidies are even more pernicious because they may actually reverse comparative advantages as production moves not to that location where fewest
resources are required but rather to the location where subsidies are the
greatest....
Clearly, a free market economy and free trade are not perfect. The
market does not respond instantaneously and painlessly to exogenous
shocks. However, the free market is far superior to any of the alternatives,
including a government directed industrial policy. Quite simply, logic and
experience strongly suggest that the free market is a far more efficient and
successful mechanism for economic decision-making than is the political
mechanism.
Unlike the market, which facilitates the transfer of assets to their most
highly valued use, political institutions tend to allocate resources on the
basis of the relative electoral strength of competing interest groups.
Id. at 59-60 (citation deleted).
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lateral support to any individual industry. 20 Governmental
intervention is also appropriate when national security is at stake.
Thus, the government should prevent dissemination of technological information which could jeopardize national defense, and should
support industries necessary to defense that are otherwise unable to
compete. According to Baxter, however, such protectionist measures "will rarely be the most cost-effective means for achieving national security goals."'2 1 The government should also set policy in
the areas of education, basic research, foreign relations, and fiscal
policies when such activities are dictated by the need for uniform
social goals, or when the intervention would serve to increase national productivity. The test involves the extent to which intervention will affect the market. If the benefits of governmental
intervention in the market outweigh the harm (costs) of the dis22
rupted economy that would result, the intervention is justified.
With respect to stimulation of the economy through the increase of productivity, the Division under Baxter promoted plans to
ensure that the federal antitrust laws and the economic environment would not inhibit investment in research and development.
Throughout the early 1980's, the Division enthusiastically supported legislation modifying the antitrust and intellectual property
laws to prevent technological inhibition and governmental encroachment on normal market activity.23 The Division has also
criticized proposals that would impose bureaucratic restraints or
controls on those firms which supported research and
24
development.
The Antitrust Division's noninterventionist economic policy is
also reflected in its stand on non-price vertical restraints on distribution. These include a number of practices, such as dealer terminations, territorial restraints, exclusive distributorships, and dual
distributorships. Having travelled from the rule of reason analysis
for non-price vertical restraints in White Motor Co. v. United
States25 to the per se standard in United States v. Arnold Schwinn &
CO.,26 the Supreme Court and the Antitrust Division have apparently halted their gyrations after the Court's well-reasoned decision
in Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.2 7 In Sylvania, the
20. Id. at 65.
21. id.
22. According to Baxter, the only situation where the benefits would outweigh the detriments is in the case of "an overwhelming market failure." Id. at

66.
23. E.g., The National Productivity and Innovation Act, S. 1841, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

25. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
26. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
27. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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Court held that non-price vertical restraints warranted rule of reason analysis under which procompetitive effects of the defendant's
28
conduct are taken into account to determine violative conduct.
The current viewpoint is that a sufficient number of socially
beneficial justifications exist to analyze non-price vertical restraints
under the rule of reason. It is believed that non-price vertical restraints promote interbrand competition and have other procompetitive effects. Although there is no current formal statement by the
Antitrust Division on vertical non-price restrictions, Richard J.
Favretto, a former Director of Operations for the Antitrust Division, delivered a speech in 1978 indicating the factors which the Division considered important in scrutinizing vertical non-price
29
retraints:
Sylvania's rule of reason analysis dictates that we weigh the effect
of vertical restrictions in reducing intrabrand competition against pos!sible benefits these restrictions may have on promoting interbrand
competition. If the benefits outweigh the adverse effects, then,the restraints are reasonable. In making this analysis, the Antitrust Division
is likely to look primarily at three factors: (1) the market power of the
company imposing the restraints; (2) the extent to which the restraints
for
impede intrabrand competition; and (3) the justifications asserted
30
the restraints in terms of promoting interbrand competition.
One aspect of non-price restrictions viewed as anticompetitive
is that all such restraints have some effect on price 31 and that they
reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers of a
particular product competing for the business of a given group of buyers ....

Although intrabrand competition may be reduced, the ability

of retailers to exploit the resulting market may be limited both by the
ability of consumers to travel to other franchised locations and, perto purchase the competing products of other
haps more importantly,
32
manufacturers.
Among the procompetitive effects of vertical restrictions is the
acquisition of market presence or efficiencies in the distribution of
products which permit new or small manufacturers "to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of
28. Id. at 59.
29. Favretto, Vertical Restraints and Other Current DistributionIssues in

the Wake of Sylvania, (speech before the Southwestern Legal Foundation Symposium, Dallas, Texas, May 12, 1978), reprintedin TRADE REG. REP.(CCH)
50,370 (June 5, 1978), excerpts reprintedin S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON & J. MC.
CARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAwS 616-18 (4th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
WESTON].
30. WESTON, supra note

29, at 616.
31. Id. at 615 (citing Liebeler, 1979 Supplement to

ANTITRUST ADVISOR

§ 2.26 (2d ed. 1978), and Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of
Non-Price Vertical Restrictions,78 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 22 (1978)); see Posner, The
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach. Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 8 (1977); see also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
32. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54.
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capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer. '3 3 Another justification is that established manufacturers can utilize vertical price restraints to
maximize market penetration "to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products." 34 These and
similar services are vital for many high cost items and they are necessary to maintain the manufacturer's good will. Such activities
would not be offered in a purely competitive situation because free
riders would take advantage of those who contributed the investment.35 A vertical price restriction is not considered anticompetitive if it is necessary to comply with quality controls imposed by
37
36
statute, regulation, or the nature of the product itself.

There has been increasing concern regarding the line between
vertical activity that is considered price-fixing and is treated as a
per se offense in the courts, and vertical activity that is not pricefixing that manufacturers may attempt to justify.3 8

A 1982 inter-

view with William F. Baxter3 9 indicated that the Division may be
conforming to the majority's analysis in Sylvania, in which Justice
White's concurring opinion was referred to as questioning the per se
approach to resale price maintenance. 40 In response to a request for
clarification of the Division's stance on the application of the rule of
reason for vertical restrictions, including resale price maintenance,
Baxter indicated that the Division was searching for a case in which
41
to press for a uniform standard for all vertical restrictions.
33. Id. at 55.
34. Id. This was a basis for the dissent in Schwinn by Justices Stewart and
Harlan, who saw the need for the proper promotion of a manufacture's product
reflected in the requirement for an "active and stable dealer organization."
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 383 (1967).
35. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution,Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 285 (1975); see Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55.
36. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55 n.23 (citing as examples mandatory compliance
under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (1976) and the
Consumer Product Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (1976)).
37. Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 936-37 (5th Cir.
1975); see Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
38. See Report, 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 356, 370 (March 1,
1984); Liebeler, 1979 Supplement to ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 2.26 (2d ed. 1978);

Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12-26 (1982).
39. Interview with William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 23 (1982).

40. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59-71 (White, J., concurring).
41. Interview with William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 32-33 (1982). The case which Baxter was
looking for may have arrived in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104
S. Ct. 1464 (1984). Monsanto was alleged to have required Spray-Rite to meet
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In the early 1980's, much legislation was proposed to increase
national productivity and stimulate the economy. The bills were
proposed to counteract the country's failure to maintain a competitive edge in the international marketplace, or to stimulate the country's flagging technological productivity, whichever evil was
perceived by the particular sponsor to be the most significant factor

in the economic decline of the United States over the preceding
twenty years. Some of the bills promoted innovation indirectly,
while others addressed invention and research and development
head on.
In the area of technology, nonprofit organizations and small
businesses are leaders of productivity and competition, because they
must be creative yet efficient to compete with larger more established companies. 42 In 1980, the Patent and Trademark Amendprice restrictions-a traditional price-fixing case. 104 S. Ct. at 1465-67. In its
amicus brief, the Justice Department argued that such cases should be given
rule of reason, rather than per se, analysis. Id. at 1469-70 n.7. The Supreme
Court declined to overrule its seventy-three year old precedent, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), and found Monsanto
guilty under a per se analysis. 104 S. Ct. at 1469, 1472-73.
Another such case is NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984), in
which the NCAA, a joint venture that establishes rules and regulations governing many intercollegiate sporting events, was alleged to have placed price
restraints on its member colleges by preventing them from individually participating in prices negotiations for telecasts. 104 S. Ct. at 2952. The Tenth Circuit
had held that the NCAA's telecast plan was per se illegal price fixing. 707 F.2d
at 1160. In its amicus brief to the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission argued that in a situation where the per se
analysis was not clearly applicable, either a full or truncated rule of reason
analysis should be applied. Amicus Brief of Solicitor General at 31-32, NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). Carried to its logical conclusion, this
argument dictates that all vertical restraints be analyzed under the rule of reason in one form or another, as it is rare, if ever, that the per se analysis clearly
applies. The Solicitor General argued that:
[A] retailer should not be able to tell a manufacturer that the manufacturer, whatever his own views about the way his product should be handled
at the retail level, must permit that retailer to sell his product as the retailer wishes and the manufacturer has nothing to say about it. It should be
a two-way consensual arrangement about how the product is handled at the
point of sale.
Id. The Supreme Court agreed. 104 St. Ct. at 2969. Although the NCAA's tele-

casts constituted facial horizontal price fixing, the Court
recogni[zed] that a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of
competition that petitioner and its member institutions seek to market is to
be preserved. It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among
amateur teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public
interest in intercollegiate athletics.
Id. Application of a per se rule was held unwarranted. Id.
42. Scheirer, supra note 6. The results of Scheirer's investigations showed
that small firms were responsible for a surprisingly large proportion of ongoing
national research and development in high technology fields. The report dis-
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ments of 198043 (the Bayh-Dole Act) were enacted to increase the
incentive for small inventive entities to innovate, and to commercialize resultant inventions. The legislation was also intended to
promote participation of small businesses and nonprofit organizations in federal procurement. The stated objective of the BayhDole Act reflected concern for the economic wellbeing of the country, and exemplified the policy underlying the bills related to research ventures during this time period:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or development; to encourage maximum participation
of small business firms in federally supported research and development efforts; to promote collaboration between commercial concerns
and nonprofit organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are
used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise; to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made
in the United States by United States industry and labor; to ensure
that the Government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported
inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public
against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the
costs of administering policies in this area.44
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198145 supported commercialized innovation by creating a tax credit for investment in certain
research-oriented ventures. This Act provided a twenty-five percent tax credit for companies investing in additional research and
development. 46 In 1983, after years of debate on the subject, the
closed that: (1) firms of less than 1,000 employees accounted for about one-half
of the major innovations in the United States; (2) in such firms, the percentage
of innovations to sales was greater by one-third than in larger companies; and
(3) in such firms, the ratio of innovations to research and development staff was
about four times greater than in larger firms. Id.
43. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (1976).
44. Id. at § 200. The effect of the Bayh-Dole Act on the economy has been
described by Charles H. Herz, General Counsel fo the National Science
Foundation:
At our Agency and most others this changed existing law and practice very
little, if at all. Yet the change in perceptions that followed was remarkable.
Businessmen who 'knew' that the Government always took contractor patents suddenly became willing to consider business dealings with the Government that before they would have thought out of the question.
Herz, supra note 7, at 14. For a more detailed description of the Act and its
implications see M. Sundeen & K. Morron, CommercializingFederallyFunded
Inventions, (presented at the National Meeting of the American Chemical Society, St. Louis, Missouri, April 9, 1984), and M. Sundeen & K. Morron, From
Federal Grants To Business Profit, CHEMTECH 677 (Nov. 1984).
45. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
46. President's Statement on the National Productivity and Innovation
Legislation, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1234 (Sept. 12, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as President'sStatement];President'sMessage to Congress on the National
Productivity and Innovation Legislation, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1236
(Sept. 12, 1983) [hereinafter cited as President'sMessage].

1985]

Productivity and Innovation Act

Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983 (the PTRA) was proposed. 47
The purpose of this bill was to "amend the patent law to restore the
term of the patent grant for the period of time that nonpatent regulatory requirements prevent the marketing of a patented product."148 In effect, the PTRA would extend the patent term by up to
seven years to compensate for regulatory delays in marketing a pat49
ented product or using a patented process.
Many of these bills were proposed to alter the relationship between research and development joint ventures and the antitrust
laws. Their authors sought to "encourage business concerns to undertake jointly research and development programs in order to
achieve greater efficiency and an improved capacity for competition"'' 5 by proposing various reforms of the regulatory mechanisms
52
5
of the Department of Justice ' and revisions of the antitrust laws.
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED LEGISLATION-THE NATIONAL
PRODUCTIVITY AND INNOVATION ACT OF 1983

As part of an international trade bill designed to improve the
competitiveness of United States companies in international markets by stimulating their productivity and technological growth, the
Reagan Administration developed a legislative proposal that the
President's Cabinet approved in March, 1983.5 3 The four-part bill
was intended to sweep broadly by amending the United States' antitrust, patent, and copyright laws to increase protection for joint
venturers and owners of intellectual property, as well as by molding
the regulatory mechanisms of the Department of Justice. The Administration expressed hope that the package would "insure that
the antitrust and intellectual property laws are fully compatible
with efficient creation and development of technology, while, at the
same time, maintaining strong safeguards against anticompetitive
behavior." 54 Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter reput55
edly drafted much of the proposal.
That bill, the National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983
47. S. 1306, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Many others have since followed.
See H.R. 5324, H.R. 5529, H.R. 6034, H.R. 6228, S. 1711, S. 2549, S. 2926, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
48. S. 1306, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
49. Id. Food and Drug Administration approval is one such administrative

delay.
50. H.R. 108, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983).
51. E.g., H.R. 108, H.R. 1952, H.R. 3641, H.R. 3975, S. 568, S. 737, S. 1383, S.
1561, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
52. E.g., H.R. 108, H.R. 3393, H.R. 3641, H.R. 3975, H.R. 4043, S. 1383, 98th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
53. 44 ANrTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 681 (Mar. 31, 1983).

54. President'sStatement, supra note 46, at 1235.
55. 44 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 681 (Mar. 31, 1983).
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(the Act)sa was proposed simultaneously in the House (H.R. 3878),
by Representative Moorhead, and in the Senate (S. 1841), by Senator Thurmond, on September 13, 1983. The Act dictated the antitrust analysis to be applied to certain research joint ventures,
limited the application of treble damages in both private and state
instigated antitrust actions brought against patent licensors and
joint ventures, narrowed the scope of conduct characterized as patent or copyright misuse, and increased the protection for process
patents and resultant products.5 7 As originally proposed, the Act
contained four substantive titles following the first, which set forth
the Act's short title.58 Title II addressed itself to joint research and
development ventures, while Titles III, IV and V concerned intellectual property. By November, 1983, hearings on the bill had been
held in the House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial
Law, and in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
In March, 1984, Senator Thurmond proposed to amend the Act.
The proposed amendment deleted Titles III, IV and V, and made
some minor changes in Title II.59 The amendment was effected on
April 4, 1984, leaving Title II as the only substantive provision of
the Act. Following minor revisions, both the House and Senate
passed the bill as amended. 6° President Reagan signed the bill into
law as the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (the NCRA)
on October 11, 1984.
Title II of the National Productivity and Innovation Act of
1983-the precursor to the NCRA-will first be analyzed. Title III,
IV and V, though not enacted as part of the NCRA, will then be
addressed. It is the author's hope that the substance of these remaining titles will ultimately become law.
56. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), CoNG. REC. S12,214-22 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1983), reprinted in 26 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 456-57 (Sept. 15, 1983).
57. Id.
58. The full title of the Act is: A Bill to Promote Research and Development, Encourage Innovation, Stimulate Trade, and Make Necessary and Appropriate Amendments to the Antitrust, Patent, and Copyright Laws. S. 1841, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. § 101 (1983).
59. See irfra notes 128-34, 240-43.
60. TheHouse of Representatives passed the amended act as H.R. 5041 on
May 1, 1984 by a vote of 417-0. CONG. REC. H3184 (daily ed. May 1, 1984). The
Senate pased S. 1841 as amended by a vote of 97-0 on July 31, 1984. CONG. REC.
S9512 (July 31, 1984). Differences between the two bills as amended still remained, however. The Senate thereafter appointed conferees to resolve the differences. On September 26, 1984, the Senate approved the conference
committee's resolution. CONG. REC. S11,842-45 (Sept. 26, 1984). The House
joined in approval on October 1, 1984. CONG. REC. H10,565-70 (Oct. 1, 1984).
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A.
1.

Title II-Joint Research and Development Ventures

History and Purpose

Unlike purely horizontal combinations, joint ventures, especially those formed for the purpose of conducting research and development, have the potential for contributing enormous benefits to
society and the economy. In contrast to mergers, joint ventures,
which by definition have a limited scope and duration, present little
danger of collusion on price setting and restrictions on outputs.
Thus they are given scrutiny under the rule of reason, and many
complicated factors are weighed before illegality is determined.
The Division's current policy on research and development
joint ventures is stated in its Antitrust Guide on the subject. 61 The
present policy adheres to that proposed by the Carter Administration on industrial innovation, which was to stimulate competition
through the use of antitrust policies. President Carter and his Administration, unlike President Reagan and the Antitrust Division
under Baxter and McGrath, postulated that rigorous enforcement
of the antitrust laws would stimulate competition. This, in turn,
would increase invention and innovation, which are basic to a competitive stance for the United States in international markets. 62 Because the role of research joint ventures is to promote innovation,
the reasoned and selective enforcement of the antitrust laws with
respect to joint ventures would maximize their productivitywhether it is basic or applied research, or the development of products for the market.
The Guide provides a thumbnail sketch describing the scrutiny
of joint ventures: "[L]ess intense about 'pure' basic research, undertaken without ancillary restraints on use of the results, to more intense at the developmental end of the research spectrum,
particularly if ancillary restraints are involved." 63 In every case, a
rule of reason standard is applied. 64
With respect to the effect of joint research ventures on competition in the market, the Division employs a Sherman Act, Section 1
or Clayton Act, Section 7 analysis, whichever is appropriate, to determine whether a decrease in competition has occurred.65 An acceptable justification to a challenge of anticompetitive behavior is
that the object of the venture agreement would not otherwise have
been produced. This would be the case, for example, if the individu61. U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures (Nov. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Guide].
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 1.

64. Id. at 6, 16.
65. Id. at 4-14.
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als in the venture would not have been able to afford the cost of
risks involved in the innovative process had they acted independently. 66 Other examples include ventures into an industry with no

prior history of joint research 67 or with entry barriers, 6 or where
there is a probability that free riders could appropriate without
compensation research done by a sole entity.6 9 On the other hand,
if any of the individuals had been able to perform independently
and would have, even if others had not participated, there must be70a
significant argument for scale efficiencies to justify the venture.
Collateral restraints are a second element used to decide the
legality of joint ventures. These restraints are judged under a Sherman Act, Section 1 analysis. 71 Examples of per se unjustifiable ancillary restraints are those having as their 'primary purpose to fix
prices or divide markets, as well as most tying arrangements and
group boycotts." 72 However, ancillary restrictions reasonably related to the legitimate goals of the venture are judged under the
rule of reason. 73 Examples of reasonable ancillary agreements in
66. Id. at 8-9; Baxter, supra note 18, at 11.
67. Guide, supra note 61, at 9.
68. Id. at 10.
69. Free riders are those who benefit from another's skill, industry, or capital outlay without having contributed to the production of the innovation. The
problem arises when research is not protectable under the intellectual property
laws, and is not feasibly protected as a trade secret. Baxter describes the result
as one of great disparity between the rewards the inventor can reap and the
value of the innovation to society. Baxter, supra note 18, at 7. If free riders can
not be avoided, there may be a "serious underinvestment in the creation of new
technology." Id.
70. Guide, supra note 61, at 9.
71. Id. at 14.
72. Id. at 14-15.
73. This involves three inquiries to determine whether the restraints are
reasonable: 1) whether the restrictions are "reasonably ancillary" to the primary goal of the venture; 2) whether the restrictions have a scope and duration
limited to achievement of the objective; and 3) whether the restrictions, in conjunction with other agreements, produce unreasonably anticompetitive effects.
Id. at 15. In the leading case on joint ventures, United States v. Penn-Olin
Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), Pennsalt had formed a joint venture corporation with Olin-Mathieson. Id. at 162. Pennsalt produced sodium chlorate in the
western United States, and Olin-Mathieson had previously considered entering
the market. Id. at 162. The venture was limited to the production of one product, and sales were limited to the geographic market of the southeastern United
States. Id. at 164. The Court found no evidence showing that competition
would be lessened, and remanded to determine whether either of the companies would have remained a potential competitor "in the wings." Id. at 176-77.
The criteria considered were:
(1) the number and power of the competitors in the relevant market;
(2) the background of their growth;
(3) the power of the joint venturers;
(4) the relationship of their lines of commerce;
(5) the competition existing between them and the power of each in
dealing with the competitors of the other;
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the context of intellectual property are cross-licensing and exchange of know-how in the pertinent technology necessary for success of the venture. 74 Examples cited as usually unreasonable are
those concerning price, prohibitions on the solicitation of another's
customers, the failure to introduce new products, and the discontinexploitauation of a product that competes with another's. 75 Joint
76
tion of the final product may also invite closer scrutiny.
The third element evaluated to decide the legality of joint ventures--denial of access to results of the venture to those not members of the association-may be an antitrust violation if there is
"significant competitive impact."'77 This would be the case if the object of the venture becomes vital to effective competition in the
markets with which the venture members deal, 78 or if the participants in the joint venture dominate their respective markets. 79 The
Guide indicates that "access problems" may require both Sherman
Act, Sections 1 and 2 analyses. 80 The "problem" with limitations on
access, according to the Guide, is that they at least facially resemble
boycotts or concerted refusals to deal, 81 both of which are per se
violations. Justifications for denials of access may be introduced,
however, 82 and in the event that the product of the venture is li(6)
(7)
(8)

the setting in which the joint venture was created;
the reasons and necessities for its existence;
the joint venture's line of commerce and its relationship to that of its

parents;
the adaptability of its line of commerce to non-competitive practices;
the potential power of the joint venture in the relevant market;
an appraisal of what the competition in the relevant market would
have been if one of the joint venturers had entered it alone instead of
through the joint venture;
(12) the effect, in the event of this occurrence, of the other joint venturer's potential competition; and
(13) such other factors as might indicate potential risk to competition in
the relevant market.
Id. at 177.
74. Guide, supra note 61, at 19.
75. Id. at 20.
76. Id. at 20-21.
77. Id. at 21. This is, in effect, a threat that if such "significant impact" can
be related to a refusal to license the subject technology, the joint venturer may
be unreasonably restraining competition. The mandate to include others in the
results of joint ventures effectively imposes upon the venturers the necessity of
adopting a compulsory licensing policy, although the Division here carefully
avoids the denomination. Id. at 21-24.
78. Id. at 21; see Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 17 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 409-10 (1912).
79. Guide, supra note 61, at 30.
80. Id. at 21 n.1.
81. Id. at 22.
82. Id.
(9)
(10)
(11)

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:607

censed, the venturers may charge a reasonable royalty.8 3
Interestingly, in a 1983 San Diego speech, William F. Baxter
refuted this portion of the Guide.84 He observed that allocative efficiency is optimized, on a short term basis, by free use of the subject
technology upon payment of a fixed low fee, but that over the long
run, compulsory access would smother innovation and be detrimental to consumer welfare. Unless the technology was subsidized by
the public through the mechanism of a competitive market, "there
would be no profit motive on the part of those capable of innovating
to spur the research and development of new technologies. '8 5 This
speech reflects the current policy of the Division on the subject of
intellectual property and joint research ventures, and is another indication of Baxter's economic influence on Division policy. In the
Guide, the Division concludes that "[t]he antitrust laws give businesses reasonable and ample flexibility in designing research joint
ventures," and that, although the Justice Department "can and
does consider alternative methods of conducting research that may
restrict competition less than the particular method chosen ... it
does not engage in gratuitous second-guessing of business
86
decisions."
Title II was proposed to ensure that antitrust laws do not unnecessarily restrict the formation of research and development
joint ventures, and to reduce the deterrent effect that the treble
damage award has on procompetitive joint venture efforts.8 7 These
goals are accomplished by requiring that the rule of reason be applied in deciding alleged violations of the antitrust laws by joint research and development programs, and by providing a notification
system whereby research and development joint ventures may file
pertinent market-related data with governmental entities to foreclose the imposition of treble damages if the venture subsequently
violates an antitrust law.
2. Elimination of the Per Se Standard
Section 201
(NCRA Section
ment program"
2(a)(6) and 2(b))
considered joint
83.
84.
85.
86.

of the National Productivity and Innovation Act
2) defines the term "joint research and developextensively.8 8 Section 201(1) (NCRA Sections
enumerates a group of investigative ventures to be
research and development programs for the pur-

Id. at 23.
Baxter, supra note 18, at 7-8.
Id.
Guide, supra note 61, at 24.

87. President'sStatement, supra note 46, at 1235; President'sMessage, supra

note 46, at 1236.
88. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 201 (1983).
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It also provides guidelines to determine
poses of the title.8 9
whether a venture is to be considered such a program. Section
201(2) (NCRA Section 2(a)(1)) defines "antitrust laws" to include
the Sherman Act, Wilson Tariff Act, and Clayton Act. The Federal
Trade Commission Act is also included but only to the extent that it
applies to unfair methods of competition, thereby implicitly excluding its deceptive practices provisions.
Section 202 (NCRA Section 3) proscribes application of the per
se standard in antitrust suits to programs defined in the previous
section. 9° Thus, this section effectively mandates application of the
rule of reason to joint research and development ventures. Under
prior per se analysis no pure joint venture has been found to violate
9
the antitrust laws in the absence of other anticompetitive conduct. '
An argument can therefore be made that this provision is not necessary to protect joint ventures. Its proponents assert that it will prevent courts from deviating from prior case law to find joint
venturers guilty under the per se standard. 92 Even in the absence of
legislation, however, such a result is highly unlikely to occur, given
the present political and economic atmosphere.
Another drawback to Section 202 is that it does not deter organizations that possess a primafacie research and development joint
venture facade from participating in traditionally forbidden horizontal market behavior. Without the per se standard, many private
plaintiffs would hesitate to sue, fearing that the costs associated
with the more extensive rule of reason litigation would not be economically feasible. Furthermore, when litigation is instigated, defendant companies may feel more confident that their questionable
conduct cannot be readily disposed of by the courts, and that a superficially adequate defense may provide the justification needed to
succeed in litigation. In the event that the conduct is found to violate the antitrust laws, the single damages provision of the bill (discussed below) might make such conduct economically feasible and
attractive to those who would profit significantly from the venture,
i.e., those whose profits would exceed the amount of the single damages award.
89. The Senate conferees on S. 1841 regarded this definition as "designed to
reflect the special concern with innovative joint efforts necessary to help
United States firms compete internationally, and to eliminate several types of
potentially anticompetitive conduct from coverage under the bill." S. REP. No.
427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3105, 3107-08.
90. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 202 (1983).
91. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
92. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 301-02 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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Remedies

Section 203 (NCRA Section 4) provides that private parties injured by any conduct that is subsequently found to violate the antitrust laws will be compensated only to the extent of actual
damages, that interest on the damages will be awarded for the time
93
period from the date of service of process to the date of judgment,
and that the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees, will be
awarded.94 The normal damage assessment for private plaintiffs
under the federal antitrust laws is provided for in Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, which provides "[t]hat any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws. . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sus95
tained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
In recent years, much legislation has been introduced to modify
the remedies available to private parties in certain types of antitrust
suits.96 This legislation has taken several forms. Thus it is important to evaluate the pros and cons of the trebling provision as it
exists today in order to analyze the consequences of the proposed
alterations.
Professor George Garvey of the Catholic University Columbus
School of Law recently submitted a report to the House Committee
97
on the Judiciary in response to a request by Congressman Rodino.
His study analyzing existing materials concerning the courts' use of
treble damage provisions provides a lucid summary of the topic.
According to Professor Garvey, there are two purposes for treble
damage awards: compensation and punishment.98 Punishment itself is comprised of two separate aspects, retribution and deterrence. 99 Various courts have focused on these different aspects,
although all recognize the several purposes of the trebling provision.1°° Garvey stated that there was little information to be found
in the literature describing the economic implications of the treble
damage award.10 1 He found in general, however, that compensation
is not widely accepted by economists as a valid goal of private ac93. The interest awarded under the Act was changed in the enacted version
to "beginning on the earliest date for which injury can be established and ending on the date of judgment. .. ." NCRA § (4)(d).
94. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 203 (1983).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
96. E.g., Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C.A.

§§ 4001-21

(Supp. 1984).
97. Garvey, supra note 4.
98. Id. at 357.
99. Id.

100. Id. See Garvey, supra note 4, at 358 (discussion of Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick).

101. Id. at 361.
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tions, and that deterrence was more favored as a goal because it
10 2
promotes competition by economically injuring the monopolist.
Economists who focus on deterrence as a goal of enforcement emphasize the need to impose a penalty large enough to deny the violator profits derived from illegal conduct. To achieve adequate
deterrence, the multiplier in the damage provision must offset any
likelihood that the violation would remain undetected.'0 3 It is difficult to assess, however, the probability that a violation would go
undetected, and there is always the danger that non-concealed
procompetitive conduct would be overdeterred (any deterence of
procompetitive conduct is overdeterrence), while concealed illicit
activities would be underdeterred. This analysis can be criticized
because risk-averse managers would be overdeterred by large penalties, while the conduct of risk-neutral managers would not be altered if the penalties were high and enforcement were low, or if the
penalties were less costly and enforcement were thorough. Thus,
enforcement costs may be kept at a minimum if the penalties are
large, but as long as enforcement procedures remain imperfect, i.e.,
they impose liability on some who do not deserve it and allow some
violators to go free, heavy penalties might unduly discourage conduct which is procompetitive. 1° 4 Another factor worth examining
in assessing the treble damage award is the possibility that suits will
be instigated more frequently if the amount of the award is large.'0 5
Despite these concerns, Garvey concludes that the treble damage
remedy is effective, and that "any modification of the remedy
should ... be approached cautiously."'1 6
The tenet that obviously anticompetitive behavior should be
punished more severely than conduct which possesses some
procompetitive aspects is widely accepted in antitrust practice, and
it has not been seriously questioned. 10 7 The perception that treble
damages might provide a disincentive for procompetitive behavior,
however, has recently become a concern to economists and the
government. 0 8
102. Id.
103. Id. at 362.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Baxter, supra note 18, at 48. "[A]ntitrust remedial law should be
amended to eliminate mandatory treble damages for all but the most serious
antitrust violations." Id.
108. The National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983: Hearings on
HK 3878 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commerce Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (statement of William F.
Baxter, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings]; LES Statement, supra note 13; President's Message, supra
note 46, at 1236; President'sStatement, supra note 46, at 1236; Baldrige, supra
note 4, at 4; Baxter supra note 18; Creighton, supra note 13; The NationalPro-

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:607

The present Administration and most commentators currently
favor the imposition of single rather than treble damages for research and development joint ventures that are found to violate the
antitrust laws. A widely recited basis for this proposal is that:
The treble damages remedy is appropriate and necessary to deter conduct that is plainly and inherently anticompetitive and that is carried
out in secret ....

However, where the conduct may very well be

procompetitive and is carried out in the open, the availability
of puni09
tive damage remedies is unfair and counterproductive.
Inherent in this statement are two propositions. First, traditional "per se" behavior should be punished more harshly than behavior considered worthy of rule of reason analysis, and that
trebling damages is a fair way to address such a violator's anticompetitive conduct. Second, the treble damages penalty may deter
some research and development joint ventures which the government seeks to encourage110
Proponents of the theory that treble damages are universally
unfair focus on the unfairness to the defendant who has already
been found guilty of an antitrust violation. It is the author's opinion
that the injured plaintiff has too often not been counted among
those who have an interest in the damages issue. Unfairness will
therefore be discussed with respect to both parties.
Opponents of treble damages argue that the liberalization of
pleading and practice rules since implementation of the Clayton
Act has led to an increase in damage awards to unworthy, as well as
worthy plaintiffs."' They assert that this practice has increased
since the Supreme Court's ruling in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc.,112 in which the Court held that damages need not be proven
with precision. Although damages are not awarded on the basis of
speculation alone, courts, as well as juries, award substantial damages on the basis of less than airtight evidence. Moreover, the relaxed standard for proof of damages may have increased the
number of suits."L 3 Opponents also claim that large defendants may

be effectively coerced into inequitable settlements with small plainductivity and Innovation Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 1841 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division) [hereinafter cited as McGrath]. This theory has developed concurrently with the Chicago school of
economic theory, although it is certainly not so limited in popularity.
109. Baxter, supra note 18, at 48.
110. Thus, "[e]ven though the uncertainty will be slight in most cases, the
risk is substantially increased by the length, complexity and cost of antitrust
suits and by the fact that a successful claimant under the antitrust laws is automatically entitled to three times the damages actually suffered." Id.
111. Garvey, supra note 4, at 364.
112. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
113. Garvey, supra note 4, at 364.
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tiffs to avoid the risk of greater loss in litigation.11 4 Finally, opponents of the treble damages remedy argue that the class action, as a
device in private antitrust enforcement, subjects defendant firms to
such great potential monetary loss should the case go to trial that
many defendants settle early, even if the allegations are
115
meritless.
To combat the unfairness of the mandatory treble damage remedy, courts have increased the incidence of summary disposition of
antitrust cases." 6 In addition, it has been observed that since 1973
the Supreme Court has altered its antitrust philosophy by considering more data on the economic impact of commercial activities,
other than price-fixing and horizontal market allocations, that exhibit procompetitive effects." 7 The result of this change in philosophy is that, although the unfairness of the damages assessed is
ameliorated by considering procompetitive effects, the potential for
unfair imposition of damages remains (assuming the imposition of
damages is unfair to begin with). Furthermore, the incidence of private actions is becoming skewed due to manipulations of standing
by the courts. "If courts were not compelled to treble potentially
significant damages, particularly when defendants appear blameless or the conduct is arguably procompetitive ... they would not
so often place restrictions on plaintiffs' right to sue."118 To the extent that the treble award encourages private enforcement, the uncertainty of private plaintiff standing is a disincentive for suit.
In the author's opinion, a plaintiff that is permitted only to recover actual damages is treated unfairly. When all or a substantial
part of the damages are difficult to assess, the incentive for an injured party to sue will decrease. The incentive to sue also decreases
when the potential reimbursement will not sufficiently cover the
costs of potentially devastating litigation. If the potential financial
reimbursement is low enough, the incentive to sue will decrease to
the point where an injured party will not sue and thus will not be
compensated at all by an antitrust violator.
Critics of the treble damages remedy also argue that it greatly
deters procompetitive and potentially procompetitive activity." 9 It
is inherently desirable that enforcement of the antitrust laws be efficient. Those who perform illegal acts, such as per se violators,
should always be found liable, whereas innocent parties, whose activities do not fall within the proscriptions of antitrust policy, and
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 365.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 366.
119. Id. (citing R. POsNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 222
(1976)).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:607

which may have valuable procompetitive effects, should not be
found liable. It is also self-evident that to catch all of the violators,
the activities of many innocent parties must be scrutinized. Professor Garvey found that a very aggressive enforcement policy could
deter socially beneficial conduct by being overbroad in its effect.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this conclusion. 120 Thus,
critics claim that treble damages, whether perceived as punitive or
merely economically injurious, may deter legal conduct that approaches the borderline of illegality; the greater the potential losses
from litigation, the fewer questionable activities the risk-averse
manager will undertake.' 2 ' Of course, under such an analysis the
conclusion is inescapable that products resulting from conduct close
to the borderline will not be produced, and to that extent the production level and economy will be depressed.
Another argument against the treble damages remedy is that,
although the deterrence policy underlying its use is facially reasonable, there is no empirical data describing firms' deterrence from
certain conduct due to trebling. Indeed, this postulation requires
proof of a negative, which may well be impossible to adduce.
A criticism that can be raised against an actual damages remedy is that reasonable activity, such as research joint ventures,
which the courts have traditionally accorded rule of reason analysis,
is not well-defined. Collusion has always been given the per se standard, but boycotts and tying arrangements, which are similarly
treated activities, can in some circumstances be justified. 122 Thus,
the definition of justifiable conduct is not precise in the absence of
all the particular facts of the case. Granting to certain groups, such
as research investors, the privilege to submit what might be an unjustifiable amount of evidence in response to a prima facie case
may be seen as an unjustifiable waste of judicial resources when it
is apparent that the conduct undertaken by the defendant has no
redeeming value.
Another drawback to detrebling is that if damages are difficult
to determine, an injured party will have a decreased incentive to
sue. As previously mentioned, this undermines the theory that detrebling would increase the fairness of the award. When there are
disincentives to sue, the incentives to assume greater risks on the
part of the actor may lead to an increase in injurious conduct that
120. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). Excessive enforcement "holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence; salutary

and procompetitive conduct lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen who chose to be excessively cautious in

the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to criminal punishment for
even a good-faith error of judgment." Id. at 441.
121. Garvey, supra note 4, at 366.
122. Id. at 369.

1985]

Productivity and Innovation Act

approaches the fine line between legal and illegal behavior, or the
assumption of a greater risk, i.e., the attempt to approach even
closer to that line to reap a profit.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against detrebling damages is that if conduct is sufficiently unreasonable and anticompetitive to support a finding of illegality, the method of analysis (per se
or rule of reason) should not be the basis for distinguishing the penalty. Stimulation of the economy is not a sufficient reason for actors in a joint research venture to warrant more leniency than, for
example, colluders who also may be able to argue an increase in
competition due to their activity. In both cases the actions are illegal. The rejoinder to this argument is that joint venturers who violate the antitrust laws have inadvertently crossed the less than
bright line of illegality in an attempt to promote the economy. This
is not a valid argument. There is no excuse for a violator's movement so far into the grey zone of joint venture activities, which have
been accorded rule of reason analysis. The finding of a violation in
such a case indicates that the parties were attempting to walk the
line and reap as many of the rewards as they could at the expense of
the public, which has given them the benefit of a less burdensome
standard in the courts. It can be argued that such behavior warrants even harsher treatment than treble damages.
At least two alternatives to detrebling have been proposed. Joseph Creighton, Vice President of the Harris Corporation of Florida, suggests that if Congress is willing to detreble in the case of
research joint ventures because of their procompetitive potential, it
is reasonable to eliminate the award of damages altogether for
those ventures that follow the disclosure system proposed in H.R.
3878, S. 1841.123 This suggestion has not been widely supported.
Professor Garvey suggests that the assessment of the value of trebling damages is not yet complete, and that substantive changes of
the antitrust laws should be considered as a more certain
12 4
alternative.
Under Section 203(a) (NCRA Section 4(a)), those entitled to recovery under Section 4 of the Clayton Act and the other provisions
in this section, would recover not only their damages, but also simple interest on the damage amount for the time period between the
service of the complaint and the date of judgment. 125 This provision for the award of damages did not represent a change in antitrust law (Section 4 of the Clayton Act states the same time
123. Creighton, supra note 13. For a discussion of the notification and disclosure provisions see infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
124. Garvey, supra note 4.
125. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a) (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 203(a) (1983). As enacted, NCRA § 4(d) changed the time frame for interest calculation. See supra note 93.
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frame), 1 26 but it did differ from the normal time period for the
award of interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which allows the recovery of interest "calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment. ' 127 Prejudgment interest was included in the proposed
legislation to compensate more fully the plaintiff, who, under the
other provisions of the Act, would be receiving single rather than
treble damages. 128 Furthermore, the provision deters the defendant, who under the Act would be subject to the rule of reason and
permitted to advance a full defense, from protracting the litigation
to increase profits. Conversely, the provision would adversely affect
the defendant whose risk-averse managers wish to produce an assertive defense, and it may increase the pressure on such a party to
settle early or put on (in the defendant's opinion) a less than satisfactory defense.
Section 203(a) of the Act further provides for the award of reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiff.1 29 This is not different from the present law under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Interestingly, Section 203(b) (NCRA Section 5(b)) does not limit
the remedy to States acting as parenspatriae to actual damages as
do the present antitrust laws. 13°
4.

Pre-Venture Notification Procedure

Section 204(a) of the proposed legislation (NCRA Section 6(a))
permits joint venturers to file a notification with the Antitrust Division in return for the privilege of asserting, in unsuccessful private
antitrust litigation, liability limited to single damages. 13 1 The limited liability is restricted to conduct disclosed in the notification. To
the extent that the interested parties are forming a venture with
the objective of research and development, this provision effectively
supersedes the notification provisions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
126. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).

127. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1982).
128. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 18, at 49-50. As enacted, NCRA § 4(d) more
fully compensates the plaintiff than the interest calculation proposed in
§ 203(a). See supra note 93.
129. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a) (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 203(a) (1983). As enacted, NCRA § 5(a) permits attorneys' fees to the
"substantially prevailing claimant." This was the last major difference to be

resolved between the Senate and House bills before enactment of the NCRA.
130. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(b) (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st

Sess. § 203(b) (1983). This provision was later amended to allow only single recovery for states. See infra note 241.
131. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(a) (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 204(a) (1983). The information required under Section 204(a) included:
1) the identity of the participating parties; 2) the nature, scope and duration of

the program; and 3) any ancillary agreements or understandings. Id. As enacted, notification under NCRA § 6(a) need only contain the identities of the
parties, and the nature and objectives of the venture.
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132

Section 204(b) (NCRA Section 6(b)) indicates that information
received in a notification will be published in the Federal Register
within thirty days of submission. 33 The purpose of Section 204(b)
publication is to permit those who may be injured to come forward
with complaints, or at least to put them on notice to prevent injury
due to an unknown collaboration in a related field. This effect is
abrogated by the ability of the filing entity, under Section 204(c)
(NCRA Section 6(d)), to request that specified information be withheld from publication for a specified period of time. i s4 If venturers
decide they do not wish to disseminate certain information, Section
204(d) (NCRA Section 6(e)) states that they have only thirty days
from submission to withdraw the notification materials.135 Thirty
days is a very short time in which to deal with any government
agency, and it compounds the problems of advanced notification.
Prenotification publication can be an enormous deterrent to
participate in the notification program, as much of the information
may be considered trade or business secrets. Also, a potential venturer, large or small, may be concerned that publication, however
limited in scope, will attract unwelcome attention that could lead to
antitrust allegations by private parties, even though the government takes no action. Information describing the number and identity of the investors alone could divulge the type of research project
or program being undertaken, which the venturers might wish to
remain a secret. Dissemination of the activities being undertaken
or objectives of the research may result in a loss of exclusivity, as
such information would inform competitiors of the feasibility of a
particular enterprise that the competitors may then also wish to attempt. Such disclosures would decrease the incentive to invest because the technological advances and advantages for the venturers
would be lost.
Section 204(e) (NCRA Section 6(f)) states that action taken by
the agencies pursuant to the notification procedure is not subject to
132. PuB. L. No. 94-435, Title II, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976). The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act, enacted to avoid merger problems associated with unscrambling afait accompli, has been criticized for its overbroad notification provisions. WESTON,
supra note 29, at 535. The information originally required by proposed Section
204(a) would have been similarly burdensome. Deletion of many of these requirements from NCRA § 6(a) as enacted has lessened this burden considerably. See supra note 131.
133. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(b) (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 204(b) (1983).
134. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(c) (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 204(c) (1983). As enacted, NCRA § 6(d) does not allow the filing party to
request withholding of the information filed under NCRA § 6(a)'s less specific
notification requirement.
135. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(d) (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 204(d) (1983).
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judicial review.1 3 6 The object of this section was to inform those
who file that the purpose of any governmental action would be to
oversee, rather than to regulate, the challenged venture. This is
clearly a form over substance problem. Regardless of the categorization, the effect of agency action on the venturer is the same. If
judicial review is precluded, a venturer which believes that it has
been injured by an agency's conduct, whether with respect to a notification procedure or subsequent investigative conduct, possesses no
procedural safeguards. The argument in defense of this provision is
that the injured party can follow established agency procedures to
pursue redress. Making these procedures the exclusive remedy,
however, may deter venturers from the filing route altogether. Because there are no requirements for certification, approval, or even
agency investigation, it is unlikely that the notification procedure
will yield many agency antitrust challenges.' 3 7 The burden of the
procedure to potential venturers may therefore outweigh the benefit of advance notification to the government.
5.

Related Legislation

Many legislative proposals relating to joint research and development ventures have been sponsored in the past four years. i 38 Because they deal only with joint venturers, criticism has been aimed
at their limited approach to the enhancement of productivity. 3 9
Some of the legislative proposals require firms that intend to initiate a joint research venture to comply with defined standards
before they may receive approval to proceed from the Department
of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. 40 These bills have
come under considerable attack:
136. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(e) (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 204(e) (1983).
137. Only twenty percent of filings pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
are ever investigated. WESTON, supra note 29, at 535. Far fewer are ever
challenged.
138. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
139. The United States and Canadian Chapter of the Licensing Executives
Society, Inc., in support of the Administration's original proposal, stated that:
Most of the pending bills deal only with joint R&D efforts and for this
reason are adequate to treat only one symptom of a widespread economic
disease. This disease has many causes, and our purpose here is not to offer
a panacea to cure it or reverse its course. However, we can suggest or, more
properly, urge ways to treat a greater number of its symptoms and hopefully to give U.S. industry the strength to eradicate the disease on its own.
We urge the elimination of barriers to the formation of joint research
ventures.... In short, we urge enactment of the single pending bill which
accomplishes all of [the necessary objectives]. That bill is ... the National
Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983.
LES Statement, supra note 13, at 3-4.
140. E.g., H.R. 108, H.R. 1952, H.R. 3641, H.R. 4043, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). The standards under these bills are known as "safe harbors."
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[S]imply because a venture fits the mold does not guarantee the avoidance of anticompetitive abuse and inefficiency. In fact, the 'if it fits the
mold, it's okay' approach is merely another form of the per se apas applied here it would be a standard of per se antitrust
proach, except
legality. 141

Other proposed bills have been criticized because of specific requirements they impose, for example, compulsory licensing of the
technology produced or mandatory acceptance of any firm that
Such a federally-imposed involunwished to join the venture.1i
tary distribution of property may constitute uncompensated taking,
which is rare in the area of intellectual property, and which would
decrease the incentive to innovate by eliminating the rewards of
1 43
Another criticism of
successful competition in the marketplace.
several of the proposals is that they would impose upon the agen-

cies a regulatory role unattractive because it would increase the
in
costs to the public,'" and because governmental interference
i 45
commerce is abhorrent to the present Administration.
B.

Title III-IntellectualProperty Licensing Under the Antitrust
Laws

The areas of law, besides tax, that have had a profound impact
on private sector research and development are antitrust and intel141. LES Statement, supra note 13, at 13-14; see Baxter, supra note 18, at 46;
Andewelt, The NationalProductivity and Innovation Act of 1983: An Effort to
Improve the Legal Climate for the Creation and Exploitation of Intellectual
Property,at 9 (speech before the Los Angeles Patent Law Association, Nov. 15,
1983) [hereinafter cited as LAPLA]. See also House Hearings,supra note 108, at
6, in which Baxter states that "none of the standards that have been proposed
would be as effective as the current antitrust standard in distinguishing
procompetitive ventures from anticompetitive ones. In fact, the proposed substitute standards could encourage anticompetitive joint research and development ventures and would inhibit many desirable ones."
142. Baxter, supra note 18, at 46; House Hearings,supra note 108, at 6.
143. Baxter, supra note 18, at 62; LAPLA, supra note 141, at 9; McGrath,
supra note 108, at 7.
144. Baxter, supra note 18, at 62; LAPLA, supra note 141, at 9.
145. Baxter, supra note 18, at 6, 54, 60, 62, wherein Baxter states:
A number of other proposals to increase the country's productivity are
far more drastic; they would require that the market mechanism itself be
[AIll
supplanted, in varying degrees, by bureaucratic decisionmakers ....
the proposals seem to be premised on the beliefs that markets and the private sector are incapable of dealing with our economic problems and that
[But, unlike] the market, which facilithe government should step in ....
tates the transfer of assets to their most highly valued use, political institutions tend to allocate resources on the basis of the relative electoral
strength of competing interest groups ... [which] might well prevent the
goverment from making [market] correction[s] for fear of losing that government subsidy.... The general insensitivity of the political mechanism
to that message is likely to result in errors that are both massive and enduring, because political constituency is likely to be strengthened by the capital
infusion.
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lectual property. 146 The policies underlying statutes regulating patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and copyrights are identical in at
least one respect: in exchange for intellectual innovation, the inventor or intellectual property owner is granted an exclusive right
to the property. The owner of intellectual property, thus, possesses
the right, as do owners of tangible property, to assign or license the
property for monetary reward. These rights provide an incentive to
produce, inter alia, technological advances, which in turn benefit
society by stimulating competition. 147 Thus, for the same reasons it
considers joint research and development ventures socially beneficial, the present Administration supports the licensing of intellectual property.
Intellectual property licensing has many beneficial effects on
productivity and the stimulation of competition. 148 The product or
process may possess properties that the owner may be unable to
exploit, but, when licensed to others, may stimulate the development of other uses. The patent also may be more extensively exploited by others, thus maximizing its usefulness. If the patent is a
pioneer in an industry, it may be the only means for others to enter
the field.149 Under a license, information enabling others to further
innovate may be disseminated. Licensing can further advance competition by delivering products and processes to the marketplace
more quickly, or at a lower cost, than would be possible by reliance
solely upon the licensee's own resources. 15°
On the other hand, intellectual property licensing may lead to
abusive restraints of trade, which tend to decrease competition. Antitrust problems arise when licenses contain certain horizontal or
vertical restrictions, such as restrictive territorial allocations or
price-fixing. The license may impermissibly extend the owner's
rights by mandating royalties past the legally granted period of exclusivity, or may require purchases from the patent owner unrelated to the patent.
146. See Rule, supra note 12, at 12.
147. See Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the PatentMonopoly:

An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966). The discussion in this article
focuses primarily on the property rights in patents, with a short discussion of

trademarks and copyrights. For a more in-depth analysis, the reader should

consult the references cited throughout this section.
148. See Baxter, supra note 18, at 28; L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST 525-26 (1977); WESTON, supra note 29, at 875-77.
149. This is particularly true for small companies, which may not possess the
resources for development in the field of art to which the license pertains. WESTON, supra note 29, at 875-77.
150. For a more extensive discussion of the benefits of license arrangements,
both to owners and society, see WESTON, supra note 29, at 877.
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Department of Justice Patent Licensing Policy

Until recently, both the Antitrust Division and the federal
courts have regarded patent licenses and licensing agreements with
hostility. Beginning in the late 1960's, the Department of Justice
began to establish a list of licensing practices which the Department
found offensive under the antitrust laws. Officials of the Department gave luncheon meetings across the country to explain these
rules for the benefit of the patent bar. The most comprehensive
and well known of these speeches was given in 1975 by Bruce B.
Wilson, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division. 151 At that time, he set forth what became known as the "nine
no-no's" of forbidden licensing practices, each of which was thought
to deserve per se Division condemnation due to inherently anticompetitive attributes. 152 The test which led to development of the
nine "no-no's" consisted of two questions. First, was the particular
licensing provision justifiable as necessary to the patentee's exploitation of his lawful monopoly? Second, were less restrictive alternatives more likely to foster competition available to the
patentee? Where the answer to the first question was no, and to the
second yes, the Department considered challenging the restriction
153
involved.
This "no-yes" test was seen as an attempt to alter the rule set
out in United States v. General Electric Co., 4 which dictated a rule
of reason approach for patent licensing agreements. Under General
Electric, licenses were to be found acceptable under the antitrust
laws unless the conditions were not "reasonably within" the reward
envisioned by the patent grant.' 15 The patent bar, as well as Con151. Wilson, Law on Licensing Practices. Myth or Reality? (speech before
the American Patent Law Association, Washington, D.C., Jan. 21, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Wilson].
152. Id. According to the nine "no-no's," a licensor may not: 1) condition the
license on purchase of unpatented materials; 2) require assignment to the licensor of related patents later issued to the licensee; 3) restrict purchasers in the
resale of licensed products; 4) restrict a licensee's freedom to deal in products or
services not within the scope of the patent; 5) agree with a licensee to deny
further licenses without the licensee's consent; 6) condition the license on taking an entire license "package"; 7) condition the license on royalties not reasonably related to the licensee's sales of the licensed products; 8) restrict a
licensee's sale of products made by use of the patented process; 9) require adherence to any minimum price respecting sale of the licensed products. Id.
153. See generally WESTON, supra note 29, at 885.
154. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
155. Id. The Court stated:
Conveying less than title to the patent or part of it, the patentee may grant
a license to make, use and vend articles under the specifications of his patent for any royalty or upon any condition the performance of which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is
entitled to secure .... We think [the patent owner] may [limit the selling
by limiting the method of sale and the price] provided the conditions of sale
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gress, criticized the Department's "no-yes" test.1 5 6 The President's
of
Commission on the Patent System explicitly proposed imposition
15 7
policies.
antitrust
and
patent
promote
to
reason
of
rule
the
In response to this criticism, the Department proposed a test to
determine the legal standard for licensing agreements which was
addressed to the legality, rather than the illegality, of the arrangement. The "ancillary restraint" test was expressed as follows:
"First, the restriction must be ancillary to carrying out the lawful
primary purpose of the agreement. Second, the scope and duration
of the restraint must be no broader than is necessary to support that
primary purpose. And third, the restriction must be otherwise reasonable under the circumstances."1 5 8
In 1978 and 1979 the Division's attitude towards the rights of
patent owners began to change. This was reflected in the speeches
of Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division.1 5 9 Ewing proposed that the policies underlying the antitrust and patent laws are not in conflict at all. Notwithstanding the
are normally and reasonably adopted to secure pecuniary reward for the
patentee's monopoly. One of the valuable elements of the exclusive right
of a patentee is to acquire profit by the price at which the article is sold.
Id. at 489-90.
156. See generally WESTON, supra note 29, at 885.
157. Id. at 853. Recommendation XXII of the President's Commission
stated:
The licensable nature of the rights granted by a patent should be clarified by specifically stating in the patent statute that: (1) applications for
patents, patents, [sic] or any interests therein may be licensed in the whole,
or in any specified part, of the field of use to which the subject matter of
the claims of the patent are directly applicable, and (2) a patent owner shall
not be deemed guilty of patent misuse merely because he agreed to a contractual provision or imposed a condition on a licensee, which has (a) a direct relation to the disclosure and claims of the patent, and (b) the
performance of which is reasonable under the circumstances to secure the
patent owner the full benefit of his invention and patent grant. This recommendation is intended to make clear that the 'rule of reason' shall constitute the guideline for determing patent misuse.
There is no doubt, in the opinion of the Commission, of the importance
to the U.S. economy of both the U.S. patent system and the antitrust laws.
Each is essential and each serves its own purpose within the framework of
our economic structure. However, conflicts between the two have arisen.
But this does not mean that the two systems are mutually exclusive, that a
strong patent system is a threat to the antitrust laws, or that the latter
cannot be effectively enforced so long as a patent system grants limited
monopolies.
Id.
158. Wilson, supra note 151.

159. Ewing, Antitrust Enforcement: A Positive Forcefor Innovation (speech
before the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Conference on U.S.
Technology Policy, Arlington, Virginia, Sept. 20, 1978), cited in WESTON, supra
note 29, at 852-53 [hereinafter cited as A Positive Force]; Ewing, Remarks on
Antitrust Enforcement and the PatentLaws, May 5, 1979,50 ANTITRUST L.J. 515
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Lipsky].

1985]

Productivity and Innovation Act

long-term hostility of the Division towards intellectual property licensing agreements, he declared that "[f]reedom to invent, develop,
make and sell the 'better mousetrap'-free of any unreasonable restraints, whether imposed by private parties or government-is
what antitrust policy is all about.' x60 Thus, consumers are the potential beneficiaries of the patent system, and competition can be
161
increased by the introduction of a patented product.
In 1981, Abbot B. Lipsky, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, adopted Ewing's proposition and took it
one step further by describing the origin of the value of patent
rights as the patentee's ability to exploit the market power of his
intellectual property. 162 Lipsky, however, departed from Ewing's
philosophy with respect to the Division's attitude towards the nine
"no-no's." Lipsky asserted that for conduct to violate the antitrust
laws, the practice must be anticompetitive due to its horizontal nature. Because all nine no-no's were vertical restrictions, and as such
possessed aspects of "rational economic policy," they deserved to be
treated almost as per se legalities.' 63 He then discussed briefly, and
rejected, each of the no-no's. 164
Roger B. Andewelt, Chief of the Intellectual Property Section
of the Antitrust Division, has more recently discussed the Division's
rejection of the no-no's.' 6 5 He asserted that patent licensing provisions can be viewed as vertical arrangements, which the Division
regards as inappropriate for per se treatment. The rule of reason
analysis would then be applied. He proposed three interdependent
economic concepts:
First, the existing patent grant should not be viewed as a threat to our
free enterprise system, but rather as an important part of it. Second,
exploitation of market power . . . should be proscribed only when it

functions anticompetitively. Third, the determination of when a ...
licensing arrangement has anticompetitive effects can be complex, and

...should be fact-specific with the inquiry focusing on the terms of
the arrangement and the structure of the economic markets
affected. 166

160. A Positive Force, supra note 159; WESTON, supra note 29, at 852.
161. See A Positive Force, supra note 159.
162. See Lipsky, supra note 159.
163. Id. at 516-17.
164. Id. at 518-23.
165. Andewelt, Basic Principles to Apply at the Patent-AntitrustInterface
(speech before the House Patent Law Association, Dec. 3, 1981); Andewelt,
Competition Policy and the PatentMisuse Doctrine (speech before the Bar Association for the District of Columbia Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section, Washington, D.C.), reprinted in 51 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 41 (Nov. 3, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Competition Policy].
166. Competition Policy, supra note 165. Andewelt indicated that even if
these principles were adopted, patent owners would still be deterred by the application of the misuse doctrine, which has often been applied in a per se manner. Id.
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In July of 1983, William F. Baxter addressed the failure "to recognize the importance of intellectual property and its efficient exploitation" by the Division and the courts. 167 In his opinion, this
short-sightedness has impeded the nation's productivity and economic growth. 68 He described licensing restrictions as often necessary to maximize the output of, and returns to, patented
property. 16 9 These restrictions include field of use provisions, nonhorizontal price restrictions in non-exclusive licenses, grant-back
clauses, and even tying agreements, as long as the effect is not a
horizontal restriction. Each of these has procompetitive aspects,
and should not be prohibited without the benefit of a factual analysis. Horizontal restraints usually exhibit no procompetitive effects,
and should be treated summarily, but Baxter stressed that care
must be taken to avoid the summary condemnation of circumstances, such as patent licensing arrangements, which are usually
vertical agreements. 170 Finally, he warned that although the courts
and governmental agencies have become more rational in their approach towards intellectual property licensing agreements, mis171
perceptions still exist under the guise of the misuse doctrine.
Thus, the Division is moving away from per se rules, and
although this might be seen as a policy package promoted by Baxter
and the present Administration, there are indications that this will
not be a short-lived trend. The Division's spokespersons are persuasive, and their criticisms of the per se standard for licensing provisions are logical. Taken in conjunction with the economic outlook
that has fostered this trend, it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement policies of the Division will long remain economically
oriented.
2. Substance of Title III
Title III was proposed to "insure that antitrust laws encourage
procompetitive intellectual property licensing" and to "ensure intellectual property owners the fruits of their ingenuity,' 72 as well
as to encourage "procompetitive intellectual property licensing"
which is intended to "spread new knowledge" and promote economic development and commercialization of technology. 73 Donald Banner, President of Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.,
167. Baxter, supra note 18, at 27.
168. Id. He described the Division's previous embracing of the nine no-no's

as unduly hostile. Id.
169. Id. at 28.
170. Id. at 35-41.
171. Id. at 41.
172. President'sStatement, supra note 46, at 1235; President'sMessage, supra
note 46, at 1237.
173. Baldrige, supra note 4, at 2.
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testified in Senate hearings that the application of the rule of reason would "ensure that courts would not strike down licenses without economic analysis" and "give businesses confidence that courts
will not return to the hostile attitude toward licensing that some
The title prohibits courts from
courts [have] displayed.... condemning intellectual property provisions until their procompetitive effects have been analyzed. It also eliminates the possibility
that a license clause found to violate the antitrust laws will subject
the contracting parties to treble damages.
Section 301 provides for the addition of a new section to the
Clayton Act prohibiting per se treatment of licenses concerning intellectual property, including "copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks, know-how, or other intellectual property."'1 75 The licenses
sought to be protected are those which have been treated harshly
by the courts, but which possess procompetitive aspects, such as
field of use licenses, licenses containing nonprice-fixing restrictions,
grant-back licenses, and certain tying arrangements. 176 It further
requires simple interest on judgments, calculated as under Section
203. This section is important to intellectual property owners because it would statutorily prohibit the per se analysis Bruce B. Wilson first enunciated in 1969, and would codify the recent trend of
the Division and courts to treat facially restrictive licensing clauses
under the rule of reason standard. The Division, through Baxter,
generally considers these arrangements vertical in nature, because
the patent owner is not in competition with the licensee. 177 Thus,
these licenses should be considered "fact-specific," with the inquiry
focusing on the terms of the arrangement and the structure of the
economic markets affected under the rule of reason. 178 The arguments for and against statutory regulation of judicial construction
of intellectual property licenses are similar to those expressed earlier in this article with regard to research and development joint
ventures. Intellectual property owners will gain some certainty,
both with respect to judicial treatment and the imposition of monetary damages. The current trend, however, is toward rule of reason
treatment in any case, and it does appear to be stable. Thus, to that
extent, the value of imposing upon the public another statute is decreased. This provision has not excited any negative reaction from
174. Hearingson S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,Copyrights and Trademarksof the Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 51
(1984) (statement of Donald W. Banner, President of Intellectual Property
Owners, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Banner].
175. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Ses.
§ 301 (1983).
176. Baxter, supra note 18, at 27-37.
177. Id. at 37.
178. Id. at 27-37, Competition Policy, supra note 165.
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economists or politicians, and has been universally favorably
179
received.
C.
1.

Title IV-Patent and CopyrightMisuse

History and Purpose

Misuse is an equitable defense against infringement where the
court is asked to evaluate the conduct of the patentee, or patent
owner, rather than that of the infringer. While conduct that would
be an antitrust violation is misuse, the misuse doctrine is broader,
encompassing activities that would not be antitrust violations if the
conduct was inequitable or anti-beneficial to the public.
If misuse is found, the courts withhold any remedy for infringement or breach of a license agreement until the conduct that constituted the misuse has ceased and its effects have been purged--even
against an infringer who has not been harmed by the plaintiff's activities. This policy permits free use of the intellectual property
and destroys its value to the owner. Although the doctrine has
been applied in all patent and copyright situations in which antitrust violations occur, it is in patent tying cases that the doctrine
originally arose and evolved.
The misuse defense was created largely in response to the development of contributory infringement during the ninteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Contributory infringement was a judicially constructed device permitting a patent owner to extend his
exclusive rights to unpatented components of the subject invention
though the patent claim did not encompass them.' s ° The misuse
defense virtually eliminated liability for contributory infringement,
condemning any attempted control by the patentee over unpatented items necessary to the patented invention.' 8 ' Patent misuse
179. Baxter supra note 18; House Hearings,supra note 108; LES Statement,

supra note 13, at 16; Mossinghoff, supra note 4.
180. The contributory infringement doctrine had its broadest interpretation
in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), in which the manufacturer of a
patented printing machine successfully alleged contributory infringement
against its competitors, who sold unpatented paper and ink products necessary

to the operation of the manufacturer's machine. The Court thus extended infringement liability to those other than the patentee who sold items necessary
to the operation of the patented invention, and permitted the manufacturer to
condition the purchase of his machine on purchase of his accessories.

181. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (defense
successful where patentee sought to extend patent through domination of market for unpatented accessory); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) (legality of attempts to control unpatented goods

measured against antitrust rather than patent standards); Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (misuse found where no antitrust violation or injury proven); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) (license
available only by operation of law after purchase of accessory material struck
down); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (re-
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denied any extension of patent rights to cover elements beyond the
scope of the patent claim, because such an extension appropriated
rights already in possession of the public.
The interplay of contributory infringement and patent misuse
created much doubt and confusion in the patent bar. Section 271 of
the 1952 Patent Act 8 2 was created to resolve this problem. Its proponents described the statute as requiring that "the mere use or
enforcement of the right to be protected against contributory in83
fringement... shall not be regarded as misuse of the patent.'1
The proposed amendment to Section 271 in Title IV of the National
Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983 would not eliminate the
doctrine of patent misuse, but would limit its application to allegations of fraud in the procurement of the patent and other circum84
stances in which an economic approach is not feasible.
Two broad types of cases now define the situations in which
misuse will likely be found.' 85 The first category involves decisions
of the patent owner with respect to whether to license, and at what
royalty. Courts have found misuse when the patent owner: (1) li186
censed one licensee at a rate different from that charged another,
1 87
(2) refused to license a patent already licensed to others,
and
(3) charged rates deemed unreasonably excessive.1 8s
The second category of cases involves situations in which the
licensors have attempted to extend the scope of patent rights.
Within this set of cases, courts have found misuse when patent own-_
ers have required a licensee to: (1) purchase unpatented products
as a condition of receiving a license for a patented product (a tiein),' 8 9 (2) refrain from dealing in products that compete with the
patented product (a tie-out or exclusive dealing), 19 (3) purchase adstriction on sale of patented goods .to extend rights to cover necessary unpatented accessory struck down); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 343 U.S. 502, 519 (1917) (attempt to allow use of patented machine
only with patentee's unpatented accessory held gravely injurious to the public
interest).
182. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982).
183. H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Seas. 9 (1952); S.REP. No. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Seas. 8 (1952).
184. Competition Policy, supra note 165, at 46.
185. Id. at 44.
186. Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9, modification denied,
245 F. Supp. 1019 (D.Alaska 1965).
187. Allied Research Prods., Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656 (N.D.
Ill. 1969).
188. American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.
1966).
189. E.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
190. McCullough v. Krammer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 813 (1948); National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255
(3d Cir. 1943).
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ditional licenses to obtain a license for the desired patent (a compulsory package license), 191 or (4) pay royalties based on sales of a
192
unpatented product.
In a recent address, Roger B. Andewelt explained that in cases
where royalties and the decision of the patent owner to license were
at issue, the effect of a misuse holding where there was no showing
of an antitrust violation was "to treat market power derived from
patents more harshly than market power derived from other lawful
means."' 193 According to Andewelt, there is no logical economic
reason "why the public would benefit from such harsher treatment
for market power derived through patents."' 194 Moreover, the public interest is served by license agreements, and thus is disserved by
a broad application of the per se doctrine to those situations.
If an attempt to extend the scope of the patent was at issue,
Andewelt stated:
The notion that affecting commerce outside the scope of the patent is
per se contrary to public policy is precisely the type of formalistic line
drawing that should not survive.... To the extent that the misuse
doctrine proscribes conduct on economic grounds that is not unlawful
under antitrust analysis, the doctrine is inconsistent with a sound competition policy
because it can deter procompetitive or otherwise desira195
ble conduct.
Title IV was proposed to eliminate the discrepancies between
the doctrine of misuse and the economic analysis used as the basis
for antitrust laws. Amending the patent and copyright laws to require that allegations of misuse be based on a showing of anticompetitive effect' 96 would "preclude courts from classifying conduct as
patent or copyright misuse on the ground that the conduct in some
way suppressed competition unless, after careful analysis, it was determined that the conduct constituted a violation of the antitrust
law."197

2.

Substance of Title IV

Section 401 would amend 35 U.S.C. § 271, by merging the present subsection (d) into subsection (c) to ensure that these subsections are read together, 198 as the Supreme Court dictated in
191. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, on remand,
418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
192. Id.
193. Competition Policy, supra note 165, at 44.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. President'sStatement, supra note 46, at 1235; President'sMessage, supra
note 46, at 1237.

197. House Hearings,supra note 108, at 11.
198. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(a), (b) (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong.,

1st Sess. § 401(a), (b) (1983).
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Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. 199 Section 401(c) then
adds a new subsection (d) to the present Section 271, listing six patent licensing practices that could not provide the basis for a holding
of misuse or illegal patent extension unless such practices are found
substantially likely to lessen competition in the particular
circumstances.

200

The first exempted practice is "licens[ing] the patent under
terms that affect commerce outside the scope of the patentee's
claims." This provision supports the Rohm & Haas exception to
traditional tying rules. It clearly condones the conduct of Rohm &
Haas which led to the 1980 Supreme Court decision.
The Supreme Court in Rohm & Haasaddressed the scope of the
misuse doctrine with respect to the limitations imposed upon it by
the original Section 271(d). 201 The primary issue was Rohm & Haas'
refusal to license a nonstaple, previously known chemical necessary
for the function of the process patent. The majority concluded that
Rohm & Haas' behavior fell within the scope of the patent owner's
rights, as the chemical was a nonstaple item with a use dependent
upon Rohin & Haas' patented method. The Rohm & Haas tying situation is one that often occurs due to the large number of unpatentable, known chemicals which possess no known useful
20 2
properties.
At least partly in support of Rohm & Haas, the Administration
included Section 401 in the National Productivity and Innovation
Act of 1983. The three subsections listed in the present Section
271(d) explicitly permit the types of activities that Rohm & Haas
spent years defending. Thus, this amendment would not alter by
legislation the Rohm & Haas decision. However, the first exemption stated in Section 401(c) is "licens[ing] the patent under terms
that affect commerce outside the scope of the patent's claim," which
would extend Rohm & Haas by condoning activities by the patent
owner such as conditioning the purchase of commercial staples on
the licensing of the patented invention.
It should be noted that the conditioning of the purchase of commercial staples was the same conduct the Court approved in Henry
v. A.B Dick Co.,20 3 which caused an intense legislative and judicial
backlash. Having seen the swing from the contributory infringement doctrine that encouraged patent owners in AB. Dick to the
199. 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
200. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(c) (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 401(c) (1983).
201. 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
202. Brief for the American Chemical Society as Amicus Curiae,Dawson

Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
203. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
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opposite extreme in the Mercoid decisions, 20 4 the author questions
whether it is wise to enact legislation that would mandate the judicial application of the antitrust laws to favor the intellectual property owner to as extreme a position as that advanced in A.B.
Dick.205 Because courts are tempering their opinions on economicbased allegations, not only with the use of economic data, but by
judicial manipulations with standing, Section 401(c)'s first exemption may be superfluous, or even harmful to the courts' decisionmaking processes.
The second activity permitted under Section 401(c) is the "restriction of a licensee of the patent in the sale of the patented product or in the sale of a product made by the patented process." This
provision would be utilized when a court finds infringement in the
use or sale of the product of a patented process. Section 401(c)
would also allow resale restrictions on licensees. With regard only
to the permissibility of resale restrictions, the second exemption
would be a valuable addition to the patent laws. Vertical restraints
may be logically seen to produce potentially procompetitive effects
by increasing the potential for financial rewards to the owner who
assists those downstream in the distribution process to commercial2 6
ize optimally the property. 0
This provision also provides intellectual property owners with
important rights in the sale and use of unpatented products that
result from their patented manufacturing process. This exemption
is mentioned in connection with Title V below, with which it should
be read. It provides investors the incentive to develop new methods
of production and use for known compounds, an incredibly costly
investment. An antitrust analysis of the activities Section 401(c) describes would be the best way to assess their effects on the patent
owner and the market.
The third activity protected from misuse under Section 401(c)
is "obligating a licensee of a patent to pay royalties which differ
from those paid by other licensees or which are allegedly excessive." This provision would codify dictum found in Brulotte v. Thys
Co.,207 in which the Supreme Court stated that "[a] patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the
208
leverage of that monopoly," for each of the patentee's licensees.
It does not require similar royalty prices for all of the licensees.
204. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid

Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
205. T. Irving & K. Morron, Dawson Chemical Company v. Rohm & Haas
Company, An Exception to TraditionalTying Rules (presented at the National

Meeting of the American Chemical Society, St. Louis, Mo., Apr. 9, 1984).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 25-41.

207. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
208. Id. at 33,
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The provision would legislatively reverse the Shrimp Peelers
cases, 20 9 in which misuse was found because the patent owners
charged different royalty rates to licensees based on the value of the
patented invention to the particular licensees. This provision supports the widely held criticism of those per se decisions. It is reasonable because determining appropriate differential royalties
should be left to the owner, as an extension of the right to determine the amount of royalties the property is worth to the public-a
right the Supreme Court approved in Brulotte. In such cases, a rule
of reason analysis is appropriate.
The fourth exemption is "obligat[ing] a licensee of the patent to
pay royalties in amounts not related to the licensee's sales of the
patented product or a product made by the patented process." This
provision would reverse the result of Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,210 in which total sales royalties, or royalties on
the patent based on the sale of an unpatented product, were found
to be misuse. This exemption follows logically from the third, for
the same underlying policy.
The fifth exemption in Section 401(c) is the exemption from
misuse for "refus[al] to license the patent to any person," which
supports and would codify the Supreme Court holding in Rohm &
Haas. The sixth exemption is a catch-all, exempting any activities
not mentioned in the five preceeding provisions, previously held to
be misuse, absent a showing of an antitrust violation. Such situations might be those which fall within the FTCA Section 5 "unfair"
methods of competition.
Section 401 and its interpreters raise a perplexing question
about the scope of the misuse doctrine should the Title eventually
be enacted. Andewelt 21 ' and other proponents of the new legislation have indicated that there are situations in which an antitrust
violation would not be found under the provisions of Section 401,
but "where courts, in exercise of their equitable jurisdiction, properly should refuse to enforce a valid patent." 212 Such a case might
involve inequitable conduct in the procurement of the patent. To
refuse enforcement despite the lack of statutory violation under
such circumstances "is sound, however, because there is a clear and
2'
definite public policy behind [it]."

3

209. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966); Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260
F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966); In re Grand Caillou Packing Co., 65 F.T.C. 799
(1964).
210. 395 U.S. 100, on remand, 418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321
(1971).
211. Competition Policy, supra note 165, at 46.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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Section 402 of the bill amends the analogous provision in the
21 4
copyright statute by substantially the same language.
3.

Evaluation

Under the misuse doctrine as it presently exists, and as it will
remain even if Section 401 is enacted, remedies for infringement
will not be available when misuse if found. In addition, not only are
the property rights unenforceable, they are rendered a nullity until
the effects of the conduct have been "purged," a term with a wide
latitude of meaning.
One of the purposes of Title IV is to increase certainty in patent
infringement litigation, where misuse is a common defense. As the
law stands today, many practitioners are concerned about the lack
of certainty regarding the factors that a court will consider to determine whether misuse has occurred. This concern may lead to hesitancy on the part of some intellectual property owners to license
with confidence. 21 5 On the other hand, many intellectual property
practitioners are comfortable with the development of the decisional law, and believe that a recognizable and workable pattern
21 6
exists.
If Title IV is passed with no clarification of its language, the
author is unsure whether certainty would be increased. Although
economic factors are considered to determine an antitrust violation,
there is a great deal of uncertainty in that area of the law, as well as
in the area of misuse. Furthermore, under Section 401, misuse
could still be found without resort to economic data for purely equitable allegations, such as fraud in procurement of the patent, or inequitable conduct before a court. A patent owner would still have
to be concerned with both patent misuse and antitrust allegations.
Those who support the proposed legislation argue that because
antitrust violations are easier for a court to determine, making litigation more predictable for the parties, Title IV would yield fairness in litigation.2 17 This opinion is laudably equitable in the
abstract, but it ignores the fact that misuse is an equitable doctrine
which arose to fill the need for a remedy in cases of inequitable
conduct. If the remedy imposed by a determination of misuse is
harsh, why should inequitable conduct, as distinct from economically anticompetitive behavior alone, not be dealt with harshly?
There is no inherently logical reason to require the same penalty
for different conduct.
214. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Seass. § 402 (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 402 (1983).
215. Baxter, supra note 18, at 45, 48-49; LAPLA, supra note 141, at 10.
216. LAPLA, supra note 141, at 19-20.
217. Competition Policy, supra note 165, at 44.
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Furthermore, as Section 401 is written, although perhaps not
intended by its drafters, misuse and antitrust violations may be
found for the same conduct, creating two standards for one remedy.
In addition, two different types of conduct, purely equitable and
purely economical, may both be considered misuse. This creates
one standard for two types of conduct. The language should be rephrased to describe more clearly the intent of the drafters. Banner
agrees that revisions to clarify Title IV should be implemented
2 18
before these provisions are enacted.
Title IV leaves unstated one procedural question, piqued by
Garvey, 219 with respect to patent misuse determined under the proposed antitrust-economic standard. Patent misuse has been found
in favor of defendants who were not financially injured by the inequitable conduct of the patent owner. 220 In contrast, antitrust litigation under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois221 and Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,222 is usually dependent upon a showing
of direct financial injury. The question remains whether direct financial injury to the defendant counter-plaintiff will be required, or
whether indirect injury will be sufficient to support allegations of
misuse. It is the author's contention that the theory of recovery for
those indirectly injured by inequitable conduct under Morton Salt
and conforming cases should prevail. In light of the policies of the
proponents of the bill, however, the issue will probably be resolved
in favor of the doctrine which permits compensation only to those
who directly suffer financial loss.
Those who testified concerning Title IV during the Senate
Hearings generally approved the title, and suggested that both Titles III and IV would "eliminate judicially created doctrines that
discourage use of potentially procompetitive licensing arrangements ... particularly among small businesses by requiring an economic analysis by a court." 223 Titles III and IV were also
interpreted to provide certainty to the legally permissible scope of
224
patent licensing.
The enactment of Title IV would implement the Supreme
Court's dictum in Rohm & Haas: "If both the patent misuse and
contributory inringement doctrines are to coexist, then, each must
have some separate sphere of operation with which the other does
not interfere." 225 In USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc.,226 Judge
218. Banner, supra note 174.
219. Garvey, supra note 4, at 358.

220. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
221. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).

222. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
223. Banner, supra note 174, at 51.

224. Id. at 53.
225. 448 U.S. at 198.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:607

Posner, perhaps in response to this proposal by the Supreme Court,
considered whether "the patent-misuse doctrine goes beyond these
specific practices [which extend a patent owner's rights] and consti'22 7
tutes a general patent licensing distinct from the antitrust law.
The court queried: "If misuse claims are not tested by conventional
antitrust principles, by what principles shall they be tested?" 2 28
Posner reasoned that because the federal antitrust laws reach to
every aspect of economic manipulation, it would be difficult to define a distinct purpose or standard for the misuse doctrine. 22 9 The
court observed that the "increasing convergence" of the two princi230
ples dictates that misuse be evaluated under antitrust analysis.
Section 401 of the proposed bill would, in effect, attempt to codify both courts' dicta. Congress has attempted to create two nonoverlapping standards for misuse, depending on the alleged infringing conduct of the patent owner, by imposing on courts the necessity of performing an antitrust analysis for alleged practices which
would potentially impair competition. Conduct which does not possess that potential will be assessed under an equitable or fairness
standard.
Title IV possesses the most exciting potential in the proposed
legislation. Its enactment would stabilize this area of the law and
create a manageable standard for analysis when courts are
presented with patent misuse and related antitrust issues. The language of the provisions should be tightened to express its intent
more clearly, but, in the balance, Congress has combined well-reasoned dictates of the Supreme Court with presently established policies to promote the objectives of maximizing the innovator's
rewards to stimulate innovation and thus enhance the economy.
D.

Title V-Process Patents

Process patents are an important component of competition,
and thus their commercialization stimulates the economy. An example given by Gerald Mossinghoff, former Commissioner of Pat231
ents and Trademarks, is the process for manufacturing insulin.
Insulin is naturally occurring, and is thus precluded from patent
protection under United States law. New methods for its production are patentable, however, and they can be extremely valuable,
both to society and, potentially, to the patent owner. The owner of
such a patented process is at a disadvantage under the existing pat226. 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 2455 (1983).

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

694 F.2d at 511.
Id. at 512.

Id.
Id. at 511-12.
Mossinghoff, supra note 4, at 7.
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ent laws where the owner of a product patent is not: the owner of a
product patent may prevent the manufacture, sale and use of the
invention even if the product is manufactured abroad. The owner
of a process patent may not.
Under the current laws, an owner of a process patent has no
means of controlling the use or sale of the unpatented and unpatentable products of a process. Despite the fact that a process may
be a pioneer invention and a model of utility and efficiency, under
two types of situations patent owners are prevented from reaping
the benefits of their invention.
First, other companies that manufacture the product using a
different process may continue to sell the product at their normal
price. Even though the patent owner's process is more cost effective over the long run, if he or she cannot recoup the research and
development expenditures by increasing the profits at the beginning of the federally-granted protection period, the business concern might not be able to remain viable, and the useful invention
would be abandoned. The invention might also not be considered
worth developing from the outset.
Second, competitors manufacturing the product might realize
the advantages of the patented process and take a "free ride" on the
inventor's skill, foresight, industry, and capital outlay by manufacturing the product outside of the United States using the patented
process. The result would be that the owner of the process patent
could be undercut or limited by imports of a product whose manufacture that owner facilitated.
Title V of the National Productivity and Innovation Act of
1983232 was included to encourage research and development of useful inventions by extending the exclusive rights of the owner of a
process patent to products made by that process. The objective of
Section 502 is to permit the owners of process patents the same exclusory rights granted under present law to product patent owners.2 33 Section 503 is a procedural section that would shift to an
alleged process infringer the burden of showing that its product was
not manufactured with the patented process. 234 This burden would
be imposed only when the court finds that two conditions have been
met. First, a substantial likelihood must exist that the product was
produced by the patented process. Second, the plaintiff must have
exhausted all reasonably available means, through discovery or
232. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 501-03 (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st
Seas. §§ 501-03 (1983).
233. S. 1841,98th Cong., 1st Ses. § 502 (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Seas.
§ 502 (1983).
234. S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 503 (1983), H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Ses.
§ 503 (1983).
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otherwise, to determine the process that was actually used in the
production of the product.
Many other countries provide similar protection for their process patent owners.2 35 The provisions of Title V attempt to provide
process patent owners in the United States the same rights now
possessed by United States product patent owners and many foreign
product and process patent owners.
Another benefit of Title V to the process patent owner is the
effective use of the Customs Service to limit importation of infringing products. Sections 502 and 503 amend the present 35 U.S.C.
§ 154 to permit process patent owners the right to exclude others
from using or selling products manufactured by such a process
outside the United States.23 At the present time, a process patent
owner may register with the Service, but exclusion under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a) will not be implemented unless the owner can show, first,
that the products are manufactured by his process, and second, that
the effect of such importation is "to destroy or substantially injure
an industry ... or to prevent the establishment of ... an industry,
or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United
States.... -237 These burdens of proof on the complainant are so
onerous that registration is not a realistic option for many process
patent owners, while the holders of product patents need only
prove infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 to obtain exclusionary
protection. If Section 401(c)'s second exemption (which would revise Section 271 to include the unpatented products of patented
processes) is enacted, that, in conjunction with Title V, would make
registration a feasible and rewarding option. Proponents thus see
Sections 502 and 503 as "closing the loophole" in process patent
23
protection. 8
There has been no controversy over the objectives of proposed
Title V, and all those who have publicly discussed the provisions
have favored them. 239 The author, however, forsees a problem with
235. For instance, in European Patent Convention (EPC) counties, patentees
reap the benefit of EPC Article 64(2), which provides: "If the subject matter of

the European patent is a process, the protection conferred by the patent shall
extend to the products directly obtained by such process."
236. Baxter, supra note 18; President's Statement, supra note 46, at 1235;
President'sMessage, supra note 46, at 1237.
237. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982).
238. See, e.g., Hearings of S.1535 and S.1841 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarksfor the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1984) (statement of Donald W. Banner, President, American
Intellectual Property Association).
239. Hearingson S.1535 and S.1841 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks on the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1984) (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Assistant Secretary and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks); Hearings on S.1535 and S.1841
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate
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the application of Title V in at least one situation: it will cause unfairness to the foreign-based defendant importer that owns a process which is a trade secret or otherwise undisclosed intellectual
property in its own country. Not wishing to disclose a trade secret,
the importer will be unable to show under Section 503 that the
product is not manufactured by the plaintiff's process. This may
destroy its United States market as a result of the remedies available to American patentees under 19 U.S.C. § 1337. On the other
hand, this is probably not a common occurrence, and when it does
occur, the defendant will have the opportunity to produce affidavits
or evidence which could be held confidential at an in camera
review.
In conclusion, Title V of the proposed bill would provide the
owners of process patents the same exclusionary rights granted
under current law to product patent owners, and would thus serve
to increase productivity and competition by stimulating the initiation of development and commercialization of process inventions.
The author endorses Section 502 wholeheartedly, and believes that
implementation of such a provision would provide adequate and deserved protection to United States patent owners to allow them to
maximize their returns.
E. Amendments to the Act
1.

Background

The most radical of all proposed amendments to the Act was
the deletion of Titles III, IV, and V, dealing with intellectual property, effective on April 4, 1984.240 This left Title II as the only substantive provision of the Act.
A subsection (c) was added to Section 203 to limit recoveries to
single damages in cases brought by states against joint research and
development ventures.24 ' Section 204(b) was amended with respect
to its basic presumption of disclosure for pre-venture notification
filing information. The amendment would reverse the priorities so
that such information will be maintained in confidence by the govComm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1984) (statement of Bernard R.
Pravel, President, American Intellectual Property Law Association); President's Statement, supra note 46; President's Message, supra note 46; Banner,
supra note 174; Baxter, supra note 18, at 52; LAPLA, supra note 141, at 13; LES
Statement, supra note 13, at 21-23; McGrath, supra note 108; Rule, supra note
13, at 18; House Hearings,supra note 108, at 12.
240. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
241. The NationalProductivity and Innovation Act of 1983: Hearings on S.
1841 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
(opening statement of Senator Strom Thurmond, Committee Chairman). Section 203(b) permitted States to recover three-fold damages plus a reasonable
attorney's fee. The amendment limiting states to single damages was implemented and exists as NRCA § 4(b).
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ernment agencies to which it was submitted. Because Section
204(c) was rendered superfluous by the amendment to subsection
(b), it was deleted.242 Finally, the provision of Section 205 awarding
reasonable attorneys' fees to all successful parties was later addeletions and amendments ultimately resulted in
ded. 243 All these
44
2

the NCRA.

During the Hearings on these amendments, J. Paul McGrath,
the new Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, noted the
trend of the courts in recognizing the numerous potential procompetitive results of research joint ventures, and in applying rule of
reason analysis to antitrust cases in which joint research and development ventures were involved. Nonetheless, McGrath believed
that the antitrust laws and their attendant penalties inhibited entry
into research and development ventures due to the continued perthat some courts will condemn such efception of businesspersons
24 5
forts summarily.
McGrath supports the enactment of Titles III, IV, and V, which
he considers incentives for the creation, dissemination and protection of valuable new ideas. He hopes they are passed, because he
believes that they compliment the benefits provided by Title 11.246
Although these titles have been deleted, McGrath believes it is imperative for the assurance of joint venture investors that some statutory protections be supplied as soon as possible. 247 Thus, the
Department of Justice supported the passage and implementation
of the proposed amendment even without Titles III, IV, and V.
In his statement at the same hearings, D. Bruce Merrifield, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Productivity, Technology and Innovation, expressed the opinion that the then present Business
Review Procedure described by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Amendments of 1976 had not decreased the concern of commercial enterprises regarding the effects of antitrust litigation. 248 According to
Merrifield, those procedures fail to provide the filing enterprise
with immunity from challenge by the Department of Justice, and
do not mandate a specific judicial analysis for challenges under the
antitrust laws. 249 He asserted that the bill as amended would in242. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
243. See NRCA § 5(a).
244. See supra notes 241-43.
245. McGrath, supra note 108, at 2.
246. Id. at 3-4.
247. See id. at 3.
248. The National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983: Hearings on S.
1841 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984)
(statement of D. Bruce Merrifield, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Productivity, Technology and Innovation).
249. Id. at 5. Section 203 does not, in conjunction with section 204, "shield
the venture from future DOJ challenge" except to the extent that the proposed
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crease incentives to innovate by decreasing start-up risks, which25°are
translated by industry perceptions into barriers to innovation.
The amendment to decrease states' recovery was met with
resistance by the states, as was indicated by the Hearings' testimony
of William Leech, Chairman of the Antitrust Committee of the National Association of Attorneys General. 25 1 The states perceive the
amendment as over-correcting the problem sought to be alleviated.2 52 In particular, they view the proposed limitation of the remedy in state actions to single damages as a step that would weaken
the federal antitrust laws. 253 They believe that the treble damages
remedy provides an incentive for private parties to enforce the
laws, 25 4 and provides deterrence to joint venture activities that are
255
anticompetitive.
Leech, based on his belief that "there is [no] demonstrable basis
upon which to find that joint ventures have been eliminated or substantially reduced by reason of existing ... treble damages [remedies]" and that joint ventures are not treated as per se offenses in
the courts, 25 6 concluded that more time is needed to formulate a
well-reasoned decision that would alter the balance of the antitrust
257
laws to create such a negative impact on the states.
Other testificants opposed the provisions for detrebling (Section 203), and for awarding fees to successful defendants (Section
205), for essentially the same reasons as Leech. 258 In particular,
Tydings and Kohn asserted that proposed Section 205 was unwarranted because awards to prevailing defendants are not permitted
in other antitrust suits. They believe that Section 205 would chill
pre-venture approval is in effect, and the conduct of the joint venturers, as in-

terpreted by the Department, falls within the bounds of the notification. Id.
250. Id. at 6-7.

251. The National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983: Hearingson S.

1841 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
(statement of William M. Leech, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, State of
Tennessee, Chairman, Antitrust Committee of the National Association of Attorneys General).

252. Id. at 4.
253. Id. at 5.
254. This is an understandably important economic consideration for states
at this time, when the Administration's "new federalism" is increasing financial
burdens on state governments. The result of this federal policy is that the
states have fewer resources with which to support enforcement procedures. See

id.
255. This is indirectly the same as the "incentive to enforce" argument. At

least theoretically, the greater the deterrence value of a remedy, the less state
resources need be expended on enforcement.

256. Id. at 7-8.
257. Id. at 5.
258. The National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983: Hearings on S.
1841 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
(statement of Joseph D. Tydings and Harold E. Kohn).
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private antitrust litigation. 259 Antitrust defendants are entities
which have often been successful, and so are able to cope financially
with antitrust litigation. 260 Tydings and Kohn concluded that the
inclusion of the single damages remedy and defendant counsel fees
provisions in the Act may prevent its passage because of opposition
such as theirs, and because, were such legislation to pass, Congress
would be deluged by proposals to decrease damages and provide for
defendants' counsel fees in all antitrust litigation. 26 1
2.

Evaluation of Amendments

Because Section 204 mandates confidentiality, disclosure by
venturers may be encouraged. However, as these disclosures will
no longer benefit the public by giving notice of collaborations, their
beneficial effect will be diluted.
The potential benefit of detrebling the remedy in state-instigated actions is stimulation of collaborative efforts due to the reduction of the risk of severe financial loss in unsuccessful antitrust
litigation. On the other hand, detrebling decreases the potential financial loss to joint venturers which, in turn, may increase their
risk-taking and eagerness to engage in conduct which is closer to
the line between illegal and legal conduct under the antitrust laws
(equivalent to the decrease in the deterrent effect of the antitrust
remedy). If this occurs, there will also be an increase in the likelihood of antitrust violations which, due to the lack of limitless resources and the decrease in potential awards, will decrease the
effectiveness of state enforcement procedures.
Although it is clear how costs for prevailing defendants could
be an incentive to engage in collaborative research and development, on balance it is probably an unnecessary step that, in conjunction with the other allowances of Title II, weighs perhaps too
heavily in favor of joint venturers.
The arguments of Tydings and Kohn are valid; defendants in
antitrust litigation are often financially capable of handling legal
fees. 2 62 Because this provision passed, Congress may soon be inun259. Id. at 3.
260. This is a logical and obvious conclusion. Those who have not been successful have no significant market power, or have failed entirely. In either case,
such an entity poses no threat to another firm in the same markets.
261. Id. at 5.
262. Granted, this does not take into consideration the prospective entrants
who, even though "successful" may not be in a position to cope with antitrust
litigation and its attendant costs, but it is evident that if antitrust defendants
went out of business very often, there would not be as much antitrust litigation
as there is. Furthermore, firms in the position of defendant place the ultimate
financial burden of their litigation on the public, who will either support the
company through its purchases, or withdraw support, in which case the enterprise, according to the free market theory, would not survive.
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dated with proposals to pass similar provisions for all antitrust litigation. 263 This may be too much of a burden to exchange for the
questionable public benefits.
CONCLUSION

The policies of the Reagan Administration reflect the national
concern with the state of the economy. The currently popular, and
probably correct, noninterventionism and free market economic
theories support the promotion of innovation as a means of increasing productivity and competition. These results would not only
stimulate the domestic economy, but would enhance our competitive edge in international trade as well.
Innovation and the promotion of technological advances are intimately related both to basic inventive concepts and their commercial development. Thus, the connection between the protection of
basic intellectual property rights and joint research ventures of investors is apparent. The Administration proposed the National
Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983 to promote intellectual
property rights and research and development joint ventures.
The first substantive title of the Act, Title II, forbids application of the per se analysis to research and development joint ventures in antitrust litigation, decreases the mandatory treble
damages remedy to actual damages, and alters the traditional judgment period of interest. Both the alteration of the standard and the
judgment period have been almost unanimously supported by commentators in the fields of economics, antitrust and intellectual
property law. Procompetitive aspects have always been considered
by courts, however, when judging allegations of antitrust violations
with respect to research ventures. The detrebling provision stimulated much controversy, and whether it was sound policy to enact
such a provision is highly questionable. For these reasons Title II
may have been unnecessary, imposing upon the public unwarranted
costs of legislation. Because of the detrebling provision, Title II
may lead to adverse competitive effects in the American economy
and market.
Title III imposed similar mandatory rule of reason standards on
the judiciary for intellectual property licensing agreements being
challenged with antitrust violations. These provisions suffer the
same criticisms as does Title II.
263. This is an intriguing thought. Perhaps this was the ultimate objective of
Baxter, an avid proponent of reducing the treble damage remedy in all antitrust
suits. McGrath, on the other hand, its on record as opposing the universal abolition of treble damages. CONG. REC. S9512, S9519 (daily ed. July 31, 1984); see
CONG. REC. S11842, S11843 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1984).
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Titles IV and V were the most potentially effective portions of
the proposed legislation. In Title IV, the bill attempted to protect
national interests by placing limitations on the scope and effect of
the antitrust laws and the doctrine of intellectual property misuse.
Title IV required the alteration of judicial analysis of the patent and
copyright misuse doctrines to equate it with that of the antitrust
laws. Section 401(c) may dictate permanent departures from present judicial constructs, and for this reason it should be deleted. The
remaining provisions, however, make this Title the most constructive and potentially useful to the economy. The radical nature of
Title IV also makes it the most exciting of the substantive portions
of the proposed legislation.
Title V of the proposed legislation contained a provision that
may express the unspoken intent of the framers of the 1952 patent
statute by explicitly permitting the owner of a process patent to
have conrol over introduction into the market of products produced
by the same process, wherever produced. The effect of this provision, in conjunction with Title IV, would prevent the domestic innovator and inventor from being undermined by the introduction of
such goods by one who has no license and does not otherwise promote the economy by utilizing the domestic labor force.
Unfortunately for the public, the legislation was largely emasculated by the deletion of the substantive titles concerning intellectual property rights. The bill's proponents considered Titles III, IV,
and V sufficiently controversial to put into jeopardy the passage of
the bill as a whole and decided to sever the titles dealing with intellectual property from the original package.
Since the enactment of the NCRA, the only activity with respect to the titles deleted during the amendments has been the introduction of a bill by Representative Moorhead very similar to
64
Title V of the National Productivity and Innovation Act of 1983.2
It is unclear whether further action will be taken to promote the
objectives of Titles III, IV, and V. To the extent that innovation
depends on invention and ingenuity, it is hoped that the promotion
and passage of Title II, which pertains only to the interface between
research and development joint ventures, may achieve its intended
result. However, it is the author's conviction that this title of the
bill is superfluous. It adds nothing to the current state of the law,
nor will it increase competition and trade in the United States.
264. H.R. 1069, introduced in the House on February 7,1985. 29 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 391 (Feb. 14, 1985).

